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Abstract

Alongside rampant state violence, the systematic disenfranchisement of minorities and a
draconian approach to dissent, since 2014 India has been the site of a relentless project of
managerial competence. Projects like the Aadhaar biometric identity programme, the
government’s embrace of performance indices, and the construction of a massive new
capital in central Delhi – the case studies at the heart of this thesis – promise a new,
transforming nation, characterised by Narendra Modi’s slogan “maximum governance,
minimum government”. Dramatizing efficiency and transparency against the perceived
inefficiency and corruption of the old India, such projects’ aesthetics allow a violent
Hindu majoritarian government to claim global respectability and leadership and
underwrite an aspirational managerial populism. At the same time, the apparatus of
maximum governance – which encompasses not just PR and advertising but also novel
forms of measurement and identification, laws, regulations, organizational processes and
built environments – is bringing about radical shifts in Indian state and society.
Empowering new kinds of agents and institutions, these infrastructures are at the core of
a vast project of neoliberal redistribution, leading to exclusion and impoverishment,
while cementing Hindu majoritarian power. Most worryingly, the ever-shifting ambiguity
of maximum governance elides contradiction and short circuits failure, presenting a
predicament for democracy and dissent.
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“Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday said that the country still doesn't know the real
meaning of minimum government and maximum governance.
In an exclusive interview with Aaj Tak, PM Modi said that the sad thing about this
country is that we don't research about these things.”1
-

India Today

“For many of us in India, governance has been an intractable problem.”2
- Nandan Nilekani

Like many words used in large corporations, intergovernmental organizations and other
corridors of power, “governance” is both self-evident and endlessly in need of
explication. Attached to modifiers like “corporate”, “global”, “market” or “good”, it
refers to regulations and procedures that determine how things are carried out.3
According to the proponents of “high quality” governance, it enables the smooth and
predictable functioning of organizations and economies regardless of the individuals who
populate them. Often these organizations are states, usually in the developing world.
Neoliberal theorist Francis Fukuyama writes, “the quality of governance is different from
the ends that governance is meant to fulfil… governance is thus about execution … as

India Today Web Desk, “PM Modi Explains Minimum Government and Maximum Governance.”
Nilekani, Imagining India, 362.
3
The World Bank defines governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a
country’s economic and social resources for development”. World Bank, Governance and Development.
1
2
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opposed to politics”.4 As a long tradition of critical scholarship and activism has pointed
out, the segregation of politics away from administration is often profoundly antidemocratic, placing the efficient functioning of a state imagined as a machine out of the
fray of politics and in the domain of select experts.5 Regardless of whether one supports
or opposes governance, and despite the continuing vagueness of the term, there appears
to be a broad consensus that it names a technical domain of procedures, specifications,
and regulations.
This is no longer the case in India, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the
Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) speaks constantly of “maximum
governance and minimum governance”. In Modi’s mouth, in addition to referring to
technical rules and procedures, governance has become a neoliberal feeling and a
populist promise. In the age of maximum governance, the state works to improve India’s
score on global rankings as if playing a game. It is obsessed with indices that provide an
at-a-glance measure of performance. The plugging of “leakages” and the reduction of
inefficiency becomes a mania. Governance’s agents love case studies of “best practices”
that provide replicable models to be implemented across territories or agencies.
The replacement of the bland vagueness of “good” with the hyperbolic
“maximum” suggests that governance is no longer a matter for experts alone. Of course,
the term still refers to a set of policy interventions – often recommended by the World
Bank or comparable institutions – that are designed to increase transparency in the

Fukuyama, “What Is Governance?,” 4. This is an “initial conceptualization” that Fukuyama somewhat
complicates later in the paper.
5
Erkkilä and Piironen, “(De)Politicizing Good Governance”; Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine; Cooke,
“The Managing of the (Third) World”; Chatterjee, “Development Planning and the Indian State.”
4
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bureaucracy, ensure rule of law, or improve the ease of doing business. While such
projects have always had a palpably performative element, this has been dialled up in
recent years. Modi’s heavily promoted project to build a hundred “smart cities”, for
example, has little content except for a shared mythos of the future.6 In India today, the
form of governance has become as critical as its content.
Modi’s innovation has been to turn governance into an aesthetic and
entrepreneurial project. As such, many of the interventions made in the name of
governance transcend the technocratic realm altogether. A range of seemingly unrelated
phenomena are expressed in its increasingly fantastical idiom. The Central Vista
redevelopment to rebuild central Delhi is described, meaninglessly, as “an icon for
governance”.7 25 December, which is Christmas as well as the birth anniversary of
former BJP Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, has been designated “Good
Governance Day” and bureaucrats are compelled to attend work on what had previously
been a gazetted holiday.8 Taken to an extreme, governance takes on a popular political
valence for the vaguely defined but often invoked middle class, where it is a platform that
gestures towards virtues like transparency and efficiency with little specific content.
Governance as form transforms a body of wonkish expert knowledge into a populist
politics for the managerial class and those who aspire to it.9 The bland administrative

Datta, “Postcolonial Urban Futures.”
Sreedharan, “The Master Urbanist.”
8
There is a clear attack of Indian secularism too here taking place in the name of good governance. The
new holiday has been heavily criticized by Christian bureaucrats.
9
Of Modi’s broader platform of inclusive development (in Hindi “sabka saath, sabka vikaas”, roughly
“development with and for everyone”), Partha Chatterjee notes that “part of [it] was a promise to corporate
business interests and the upper middle class; the other part was to recognize the aspirations of the
upwardly mobile and the younger generation, who yearned for access to the glittering world of
consumption.” Chatterjee, I Am the People, 105.
6
7
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concerns that exited politics through the backdoor of the technical are rendered aesthetic
and occupy centre stage. Maximum governance has become a general shorthand for the
“new India” that Modi keeps promising: more entrepreneurial, more innovative, more
efficient, more transparent, more digital.
Because governance is so heavily mediatized it can be easy to see it simply as a
spectacle, a mask that hides the party’s true politics. Such a simplified view of mass
mediation, which has become common-sense in the age of fake news, understands the
aestheticization of maximum governance as a distraction from the true reality of things.
Thus when Modi’s BJP first embraced “vikas”, or “development”, in the run up to the
2014 elections, it was seen by some as a sign of “the duplicity of the party in presenting a
face that would be more appealing to a wider section of the electorate, while the hidden
agenda was Hindutva.”10 But aesthetics is not reducible to spectacle or even to
representation.11 While the spectacular content of maximum governance is crucial to this
story, a critique of maximum governance – even a critique that sees it primarily as form –
cannot stop with seeing it as a mask. While the analysis of the governance as form must
address the mass media, it should not be limited to it, for a capacious understanding of
media can help us unpack the many sociotechnical systems that are being deployed in the
name of governance.12
Despite the fact that the promises of maximum governance have not and cannot
materialize, major managerial shifts have occurred in Indian statecraft since the BJP’s

Gopal Jayal, “Introduction,” xxi.
Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics.
12
Here I particularly draw from the “cultural techniques” project of German media theory. See for example
Siegert, Cultural Techniques: Grids, Filters, Doors, and Other Articulations of the Real; Martin,
“Infrastructure and Mediapolitics.”
10
11
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election win of 2014, the first time in three decades that a party has ruled the country with
an outright majority. A new culture and aesthetics of performance tracking is
proliferating at every level of the government. A vast programme of demolition and
construction, which will result in a new Parliament building and massive new
government offices, is underway in the centre of the national capital. Almost every
resident of India is now enrolled in a biometric identity database that is used for
everything from opening bank accounts to targeting voters to excluding Muslims from
Indian citizenship.13 These shifts in form and procedure underwrite concrete changes in
the everyday workings of the state and in what it means to be a citizen. However, the
changes that are taking place are not the changes that are promised: the outcomes of
biometrics, of dashboards, of the central vista redevelopment — the three cases studies
this thesis considers in depth — are often very different from the declarations that are
made on their behalf. More often than not, the sociotechnical systems instituted in the
name of maximum governance facilitate a neoliberal programme of extraction and
accumulation of data, capital and resources. And while “minimum government” is
maximum governance’s corollary promise, these schemes tend to centralize and enhance
the power of an increasingly violent and majoritarian state.14

Governance and Hindutva

13

Khera, Dissent on Aadhaar.
As anthropologist of technology Nafis Hasan puts it, “lesser or leaner government does not necessarily
translate into either less regulation or weaker states. Indeed, it proliferates the sites for regulation and
domination by creating autonomous entities of government that are not part of the formal state apparatus
but are instead guided by an enterprise logic.” Hasan, “‘Slow Violence’ and Vacant Citizenship– The
Legacies of India’s Digital Governance,” 94.
14
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The BJP’s politics are usually understood chiefly in terms of the ethno-nationalist
ideology of Hindutva. First articulated by VD Savarkar in the 1920s, Hindutva
(translating to “Hinduness”) sees the multi-cultural and multi-religious India as the holy
land of the Hindus. According to political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot, under Hindutva
“Indian culture was to be defined as Hindu culture, and the minorities were to be
assimilated by their paying allegiance to the symbols and mainstays of the majority as
those of the nation”.15 Today, it is the animating ideological force behind a host of rightwing parties and organizations in India, clustering around the Rashitraya Swayamsewak
Sangh, “a tentacular organization that is exceptional for its longevity and its reach”, of
which the BJP is the national electoral front.16
What is the relationship between governance and Hindutva? Niraja Gopal Jayal, a
historian of citizenship in India, describes the relationship between two sides of Modi’s
politics – “vikas”, or progress, and Hindutva – as one of “deep, persistent and almost
irreconcilable tension”.17 Though this is an appealing reading, it only holds because Jayal
collapses progress, governance and technology, all associated with Western modernity.
Rather than treating governance, technology and progress as parts of the same imported
project of techno-modernity – and hence opposed to the “traditionalism” of Hindutva –
vikas (or its bedfellow, governance) and Hindtuva can more productively be understood
as interlocking and occasionally overlapping projects.18
Rather than being Hindutva’s opposite, governance might be another way of

15

Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism, 5.
Jaffrelot, Modi’s India, 29.
17
Gopal Jayal, “Introduction.”
18
For more an interlocking relationship between neoliberalism and Hindutva, see Gopalakrishnan,
“Neoliberalism and Hindutva – Fascism, Free Markets and the Restructuring of Indian Capitalism”;
Chatterjee, I Am the People; Chhachhi, “Neoliberalism, Hindutva and Gender.”
16
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expressing some of its most pernicious ideals. As management scholar RFI Smith points
out, governance has a particular valence in India, indexing not only modern European
ideas about control but also Hindu ideals about virtue. The Hindi “shaasan”, which
governance is usually translated as, refers to “administration and other terms such as
kingship, dominion, rule, direction, edict, management and guidance.” In Modi’s mouth,
“good governance as accountable, citizen-centred government seems to take second place
to governance as a tight hand on the reins.”19 The problematic of maximum governance
in the age of Hindutva lies precisely in the slippage between the cybernetic fantasy of
governance as a self-correcting digital system and governance as virtuous Hindu
kingship.
At the same time, projects of “Digital India”, another of Modi’s catchphrases, and
one which is central to maximum governance, are increasingly Hinduised. In the 1970s
and 1980s, Indian government IT initiatives had unwieldy acronyms like DISNIC,
GISTNIC and MEDLARS.20 By the early 2000s, according to anthropologist William
Mazzarella, the new mnemonics “manifested all the diminutive endearment of cyberpunk
convention: Andhra Pradesh’s SMART (Simple, Moral, Accountable, Responsible,
Transparent) and Kerala’s FRIENDS (Fast, Reliable, Efficient Network for Disbursement
of Services)”21. The aspirations that such acronyms indexed sought to partake of a global
techno-managerial order. Fast forward to today and these mnemonics have been replaced
by awkward multilingual puns bridging the high-tech of the 21st century with an

Smith, “Governance.” “Good governance” is also occasionally translated to “suraj”, which has similar
connotations. See Jain, Gods in the Time of Democracy.
20
These refer to the District Information System of the National Informatics Centre, the General
Information Service Terminal of the National Informatics Centre and Medical Literature Analysis and
Retrieval System.
21
Mazzarella, “Internet X-Ray.”
19
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imagined Sanskrit mythos: DARPAN (Dashboard for Analytical Review of Projects
Across Nation) also means mirror in Sanskrit. NITI Aayog translates to “policy
commission” in Hindi, where NITI is also an acronym for “National Institution for
Transforming India”.
Vikas and Hindutva are not idealist categories, then, but overlapping and
interlocking political strategies that speak to various constituents at the same time.
Maximum governance provides a sanitized, business-friendly technocratic basis on which
to make allies, project futures, win over various stakeholders and contest elections.
Bangalore billionaires, elite architects, middle-class consumers and global organizations
that might shy away from the overt communitarian violence of Hindutva happily clamour
after maximum governance’s promise of profit. Rather than attempting to uncover the
essence of the BJP, this thesis argues that the party under Modi is Hindu nationalist and
techno-managerial (as well as crony capitalist and great-leader fascist). It is not reducible
to any of these. The idea that it has a true nature that must be revealed, that the drama of
managerialism is merely a cover-up for something else, understates the many, interwoven
fronts on which politics unfolds and does a disservice to those who oppose this
government.
If there is, as Shankar Gopalakrishnan has argued, a “tactical alliance” between
neoliberalism and Hindutva, where even as Muslims are being targeted for a potential
genocide Hindu corporate elites are becoming ever richer, maximum governance is the
means by which this unfolds.22 To borrow a phrase from art historian Kajri Jain,

Gopalakrishnan, “Neoliberalism and Hindutva – Fascism, Free Markets and the Restructuring of Indian
Capitalism.”
22
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maximum governance is part of the “uneasy détente between local populisms refracted
via an idea of the global and the actual adherence to the institutional imperatives and
protocols of neoliberal free trade.”23 Governance occasionally functions as a mask for
Hindutva, but as this thesis argues it also goes hand in hand with its overt violence,
ushering in the BJP’s broader innovations: new “distributions of the sensible”, new
accumulations of capital, and new forms of exclusion and violence.24

A Populist Apparatus
This thesis combines three case studies – on the ubiquity of performance indices, the
Aadhaar biometric identity system and the new architecture of the state – in an inquiry
into maximum governance. The case studies in this thesis are knots that draw together
institutions, forms of enumeration, methods of visualization and display, practices for the
management of people and resources, the construction and ordering of space, a constantly
churning PR machinery, and more. Together they provide a sketch of a vast apparatus of
governance that has taken shape in India in the past eight years.
The apparatus, a concept drawn from Michel Foucault, brings together the range of
phenomena under whose onslaught – felt in different ways by different people –life
unfolds. Foucault describes an apparatus as “a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions”.25

23

Jain, Gods in the Time of Democracy, 254.
Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics.
25
Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 195.
24
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Living beings are “incessantly captured” in these networks, according to the philosopher
Giorgio Agamben. Building on Foucault, Agamben theorises the apparatus as a diffuse
form that congeals various subjectivities and positions in relation to multiple centres of
power.26 In the apparatus of maximum governance, these systems of power span the
BJP’s Hindu nationalism and the economic agendas of international organizations, the
technologies of control produced by the Bangalore tech industry, the brute deregulation
engineered by India’s biggest corporate families, as well as – more obliquely – the
outright violence of Hindutva.
The apparatus of governance produces various dichotomies – bureaucratic
inefficiency vs managerial efficiency, secular vs Hindu, transparency vs corruption,
governance vs government, the people vs the elite – structuring governmental practice,
the terms of discourse and how politics is ordered. By existing, by being updated with
new numbers, and being continually dramatized by the state’s PR machinery both
unofficial and official, the index dashboard, the Aadhaar system, and the Central Vista
redevelopment perform and produce the difference between efficiency and inefficiency,
between governance and government, transparency and corruption. In this way,
maximum governance produces a hegemonic vision of politics as a choice between a
technocratic, transparent, Hindu, people’s nation and a corrupt, bureaucratic secular, elite
nation. These are the terms on which politics unfolds in India today, and which
ineluctably nudge electoral politics to the right.
This production of a “chain of equivalences” is at the basis of Ernesto Laclau’s
influential theorization of populism as a “mode of articulation”. For Laclau, populism is a

26

Agamben, "What Is an Apparatus?
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linguistic and performative form that concatenates various grievances to create a single
overarching binary between the common people and an Other.27 Usually, the Other is an
ethnic or religious minority, refugees, corrupt elites or a neighbouring country. In the
case of managerial, technocratic and entrepreneurial populisms, which have been
theorized in Eastern Europe and Latin America, populists have crusaded against
corruption or positioned themselves as business leaders who will run the state like a firm;
here, the Other is a corrupt, elite regime characterized by “perceived bad governance”.28
While most scholars describe these populisms as “centrist” and distinct from more
exclusionary identity-based populisms, in India managerial and Hindu nationalist
populisms go hand in hand.
Though it has apprehensive elements to it, Modi’s populism is aspirational,
promising a new, digital India.29 His genius has been to integrate the project of Hindu
nationalism into a message of tech-savvy national resurgence and transformation. If we
follow his economic policies – the so-called “Gujarat model” of deregulation and
liberalization – India’s GDP will grow to $5 trillion by 2024 (at the time of this writing it
is just over $3 trillion). A new era of national greatness will be ushered in by projects like
Aadhaar (which is crucial to India’s digital dreams) and by NITI Aayog’s indices (which
are crucial to making Indian states more competitive). The new Central Vista project,
completed in record time, will be a world-class symbol of this great new nation.
However, the binaries produced by the apparatus of maximum governance do not

27

Laclau, On Populist Reason.
See for example Hartikainen, “Authentic Expertise”; Buštíková and Guasti, “The State as a Firm”;
Havlík, “Technocratic Populism and Political Illiberalism in Central Europe.”
29
For two influential accounts of Modi’s populism in India, see Chatterjee, I Am the People; Jaffrelot,
Modi’s India.
28
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neatly coincide. Rather, they are disjunctive, combining in various, often unexpected,
ways: efficiency, for example, has long been invoked in relation to both secular and
Hindu nationalist politics, while technocracy produces corruption just as often as the
traditional bureaucracy, though in different forms. Attending to these disjunctures, to the
slippages between these forms, the instability of these seemingly self-evident categories,
can allow for a more thorough accounting of contemporary politics and its fractures.
Hoping to do just this, the first chapter of this thesis traces a short history of efficiency
and transparency – two of the virtues that underwrite the contemporary aesthetics of
governance – in post-colonial India. Their histories reveal the various ways in which
these terms have been activated in very different political moments and the potentials
they hold today. The hope in exposing these disjunctures is not to bring out some truth
that has been masked by populist performance but to bring attention to some of the
faultlines in an order that can appear watertight, helping move beyond some of the
impasses that structure contemporary politics in India and seem to tip the playing field on
every occasion in favour of neoliberal Hindutva.30 This is the subject of this thesis’ final
chapter. Along the way, this thesis tracks institutions, infrastructures and agents that
provide entry points into the governance apparatus.

30

A crucial part of attending to such slippages and disjunctures is to examine to the ways in which these
interventions land on the ground, how they are received by people and lower-level bureaucrats. This has
unfortunately been beyond the scope of this project. However, this thesis is inspired by the work of
journalists, activists and ethnographers that track the reception of top-down government schemes. For
activist engagements with the failures of governance, particularly around Aadhaar, see for example Khera,
Dissent on Aadhaar; “Rethink Aadhaar”; “Aadhaar FAIL!”; “People’s Tribunal on Aadhaar-Related Issues:
Evidence Book.” For ethnographic literature, see for example Solanki, “Management of Performance and
Performance of Management”; Rao and Greenleaf, “Subverting ID from above and Below”; Cowan,
“Uncertain Grounds”; Chambers, “‘Lean on Me’”; Sriraman, In Pursuit of Proof; Masiero, “Digital
Governance and the Reconstruction of the Indian Anti-Poverty System.”
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Institutions
Since 1947, India’s vast bureaucracy has been a continuing site of crisis as well as the
interface through which the government in New Delhi extends control around the country
and its people. A series of proposed reforms beginning in 1949 have sought to alter the
disposition of this institution, which was inherited largely unchanged from the British.
During the later years of Nehruvian socialism, the bureaucracy implemented a complex
regime of controls that was popularly known as the license-and-permit raj, leading to a
reputation for inefficiency and corruption and new calls for reform. Under Modi, attempts
at reform have been spectacularly visible in the construction of new offices for
government employees in New Delhi, which promise to increase their efficiency and
productivity. But a major part of institutional reform in contemporary India consists of
less obviously visible innovations in institutional form that seek to reform or escape
postcolonial administration.
For example, the number of think tanks in India has doubled in the last ten years,
and the country now has over 500 think tanks, second only to the USA. Signalling a
break with the past, these institutions perform new mediations between state and private
sector. The think tanks that pop up in this thesis – NITI Aayog and Indian Software
Product Industry Roundtable (iSPIRT) – break away from the Planning Commission and
the National Association of Software and Service Companies respectively, older
institutions of the postcolonial state and capital. The new think tanks embody a
transforming India, combining the organizational spirit of startups, a commitment to free
market ideals and a subdued – but almost always visible – Hindu aesthetics. They also
mediate between the nation-state and the international community of foreign think tanks,
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other nation-states, IGOs, and NGOs, functioning, much like the consultancy, a for-profit
institutional form with which they share this particular space, as conduits by which
managerial forms filter in and out of the country.
Like governance itself, the think tank is a form that encompasses many different
types of institutions. Much of the literature on think tanks notes the vagueness and
capaciousness of the term. NITI Aayog is an organ of the state and issues policy briefs
while iSPIRT functions more like a tech-sector lobbyist. A recent book on the subject
notes that “think tanks are both incredibly diverse and difficult to define”.31 This
vagueness, which art historian Pamela Lee calls “structural blurriness”, does work for the
think tank: “it is precisely the vagaries of the term – indicating something that can’t be
easily circumscribed, named, or rationalized – that endow the think tank with its acute
sensibility and power”.32 This is true for many of the phenomena in this thesis.
Another such institutional form is “the start-up within the government”, an
increasingly visible actor in the governance space in the last few years. One of the key
actors here — and central to the first case study — is the Unique Identification
Development Authority of India (UIDAI), the state organ that is responsible for Aadhaar.
Institutions like the UIDAI are described as exceptions to the normal slow, messy
functioning of the state. Theorising this common description of the UIDAI as a start-up,
anthropologist Vijayanka Nair argues that the start-up form is a means of navigating
challenges that the bureaucratic procedural state finds difficult to resolve: “as it
encounters challenges, the state forges start-ups, which in turn regenerate the state”.33

Landry, “An Introduction to Critical Studies of Think Tanks,” 2.
Lee, Think Tank Aesthetics, 28.
33
Nair, “Governing India in Cybertime,” 523.
31
32
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Citing Aadhaar’s founder Nandan Nilekani, infrastructure scholar Ranjit Singh argues
that the UIDAI sees that the “fundamental nature of government is a platform… Such
platforms will be implemented by start-ups within the government (like the UIDAI) that
later integrate ‘into the main body of the government’”.34 In both cases, there is a vision
of the UIDAI as bringing a new energy, ethos and organizational culture – that of the
start-up – to the work of governance and ultimately transforming the state.
Communication scholar Lilly Irani, meanwhile, describes a different kind of
institution, private but nevertheless involved in the work of governance: the design
consultancy, which produces developmental knowledge that mediates between
international funding bodies, the state and communities “on the ground”. Though Irani’s
design consultancy occasionally interfaces with the state, it is more properly situated
within transnational circuits of expertise that signal the diminishment of the state in
development.35 This seeming diminishment of the state’s role might more accurately be
understood as a reorganization of the distributions of responsibility within – and the ends
of – developmental governance, where the state cedes the ground of implementation
while gaining in the domain of facilitation.
The promise of development has been central to the legitimacy and sovereignty of
the Indian state since the beginning of the postcolonial period. Postcolonial India
inherited tout court the colonial state’s bureaucratic and legal infrastructures as well,
significantly for a later section of this thesis, its architecture. In the absence of
revolutionary changes to the state structure during the transitions of 1947, a discourse of
development allowed the Nehruvian state to distance itself from the colonial state and

34
35

Singh, “Give Me a Database and I Will Raise the Nation-State,” 514.
Irani, Chasing Innovation.
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claim legitimacy.36 Since then, development has continued to play a central role in the
discourse and practice of the state. The start-up within the government, the design
consultancy, and the new think tanks produce a reanimated framing of the old problem of
development, one in which the state and its bureaucracy are not the protagonists of
development so much as its handmaidens and facilitators.
This thesis tries to situate these innovations in institutional forms within a broader
transnational ecology of actors where state and non-state are no longer easily
distinguishable from one another. The startup within the state and the government think
tank interface with an architecture practice with an attached consultancy, international
not-for-profits that promote data in governance, for-profit companies masquerading as
public agencies, national information utilities, and a range of other institutions. As
political theorist Ajay Gudavarthy puts it, governance “entailed and envisioned the
conversion of the citizen who engaged with the state into essentially a consumer in the
market... citizenship itself comes to be defined, not in terms of negotiations with the state,
but consumption of goods and services delivered by a plethora of agencies."37

Agents
One way of tracking the rise of maximum governance is to focus on the individual agents
who design, manage and implement projects of governance under Modi. These agents are
opportunistic, entrepreneurial characters for whom the slipperiness of maximum
governance provides a fertile ground on which to operate. In this they bear a family
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resemblance to the global operators that architecture theorist Keller Easterling describes
as “pirates”, smooth operators who exploit the faultlines in transnational economics and
politics.38
In the 1980s, Sam Pitroda, a US-returned tech millionaire, founded the Centre for
Development of Telematics (C-DOT), a proto-startup-within-the-state that led India’s
move from analogue to digital telephony. Before Pitroda’s arrival and the founding of CDOT — which was celebrated as a space where employees could address their boss by
name -- the waiting time to get a phone line for Indians famously extended to five years
or longer; by the late 1980s millions of new lines had been installed. International
relations scholar Itty Abraham glosses Pitroda and other charismatic nationalist managers
of techno-science as “technology czars”. These figures, who crop up throughout the story
of postcolonial Indian technoscience, “reinforce the widely circulating belief that
advances in technology come from the genius of individuals who are able to circumvent
bureaucratic hurdles and material difficulties of innovation through the sheer application
of their unique talents and skills”.39 In addition to having supposedly unique skills, these
individuals were highly networked, often close to the Prime Ministers in power (Pitroda
was one of Rajiv Gandhi’s right hand men).
While Pitroda has remained more or less devoted to the Congress party, many of
the tech czars that followed him have been more slippery. It is worth tracking agents over
time, for while they are more than happy to switch allegiances, they also come to the
table with their own agendas — if not ideologies — that are often aligned with larger
global forces. The tech billionaire Nandan Nilekani, for example, who is the architect of
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the Aadhaar biometric identity project which is the topic of the first chapter of this thesis,
ran a failed bid to become the Congress Party Member of Parliament from Bangalore in
2014. Shortly after the BJP won the central elections that year, Nilekani flew to Delhi to
meet Modi and altered the immediate ends of the Aadhaar project to suit the BJP’s
goals.40 At the same time, Nilekani continues to fund and preside over a network of
institutions that aggressively pushes an agenda of good governance for development — in
India and globally — which, though largely compatible with Modi’s “maximum
governance”, differs from it in important ways. Nilekani calls himself an “entrepreneur
within government”.41
A related type is what historian Ravinder Kaur calls the “bureaucrat-as-CEO”.42
Amitabh Kant, the CEO of the NITI Aayog and the agent at the heart of my second
chapter, is just such a character. A character who is at home at the World Economic
Forum in Davos and in central Delhi, the bureaucrat-as-CEO constantly innovates to
produce the new nation. He is a symptom of an “entrepreneurial society”, a character who
has to discharge the work of the state while balancing his book and finding
“convergences” with other actors.43 A lifelong civil servant of the Indian Administrative
Service, the top rung of the Indian bureaucracy, Kant is most famous for leading the
development of a string of tourism branding campaigns, first for the state of Kerala and
then for the nation (the well-known “Incredible India!” campaign is his handiwork).
The architect of the Central Vista redevelopment, Bimal Patel is more genial and
more genteel. From a family of architects, the grey-haired, bespectacled Gujarati is
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described as “Modi’s favourite architect”.44 A PhD in Planning from UC Berkeley, the
buildings that Patel has built since the 1990s have been chameleonic, shapeshifting to
match the needs of various (usually government or corporate) clients. His body of
scholarship, co-authored with experts at the World Bank and the Brookings Institution,
propose privatization and deregulation as the answer to the problems facing Indian cities.
Efficiency and productivity are his favourite words. Patel’s strength is not ideology, it is
image. Hailing from Gujarat, his rise has paralleled Modi’s to the point where he is today
the country’s most powerful architect, the charming and reasonable face of a new order.
The architect as global managerial professional, the bureaucrat-as-CEO and the
entrepreneur within the government: these three characters have different platforms,
ideologies and motivations but they are all entrepreneurial agents who are manipulating
and benefiting from the new India. Despite the different positions they inhabit, the three
much in common: All are upper-caste men in their sixties, who portray themselves as
children of socialist India. While it is impossible to ascertain their ideological positions,
they are clearly not of the hard-line of the Hindu right. Nilekani has run for elections on
the Congress ticket and supports a range of liberal causes and institutions and Amitabh
Kant has openly declared that beef should be allowed in India.45 All three are pragmatists
and have a predilection for public-private partnerships.
Like agents through history, whether of empires or of large corporations, they are
faces of larger systems. Behind them lurk numerous less visible actors who profit or gain
from their visibility in many ways. But this thesis is not about the dense networks of
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power and control that lurk just out of sight. Unlike shadowy business tycoons and savvy
political string-pullers, these characters don’t try to hide themselves. In fact, like
successful managers around the world, they write books about their successes, distilling
their victories into repeatable formulas that provide a hook for the aspirations of millions.
The genre of detectiving to which this thesis is aligned is not the “whodunit” but the
“howdunit”, seeking to understand how these agents have manipulated and strategically
aligned themselves within the apparatus of power to achieve their desired ends and usher
in a new order.

Infrastructures
Each of the case studies in this thesis looks at an infrastructure or set of infrastructures
between institutions of governance and various actors. “Matter than enable the movement
of other matter”, infrastructures limit what subjects can do in exchange for extending
their reach and enhancing their power.46 By producing channels of communication and
control between subjects through networked systems, infrastructures formalize relations
of power and exchange. They produce distinctions, between users and technical systems,
between designer and users, and between different kinds of users.47 Attending to their
design allows us to detect the dispositions of technosocial systems, to analyse what kinds
of communications and control they afford, who they empower, and who they exclude.
This thesis takes a range of approaches to the infrastructures of maximum governance.
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They unpack their aesthetics, the promises that are made on the behalf the main case
study, how they function in the world of images and desires. At the same time,
recognizing the technical function of infrastructures as crucial, they address how their
designs are contributing to the entrepreneurial neoliberal (and often Hindu nationalist)
restructuring of Indian state and society
The first chapter of this thesis is on the Aadhaar biometric identification project.
Aadhaar is an ecosystem of infrastructures with the registration of biometrics and the
exchange of user data for services at its core. Putatively built as a system to deliver
welfare benefits efficiently, Aadhaar has proliferated into a ubiquitous feature of life in
India. From its initial promise of “targeted” development, stemming “leakages” in the
welfare system, its targeting capabilities have been used on isolate groups of voters,
immigrants and consumers, sometimes with chilling consequences. India Stack, a set of
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) built on Aadhaar, enables entrepreneurial
actors to use the Aadhaar system for various, usually extractive ends. The project
undergirds a vision for a model of development based on Digital ID which is being
exported around the global South as part of a World Bank-supported global regime of
Identification for Development.
The second chapter turns to the performance index, an enumerative form that
NITI Aayog uses to rank territorial units against each other. The visualization and
ranking of states and districts facilitates an understanding of development as perpetual
competition in the hopes of promoting entrepreneurship. NITI Aayog’s indices often
incentivize the setting up of Aadhaar-style infrastructures to create a broader ecology of
entrepreneurship based on the extraction of data. A break from the state’s old sample-
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survey based statistical apparatus, the production of indices takes place in the name of
“competitive federalism”. In fact, these interfaces have centralized power while
inaugurating a race to the bottom in deregulation and privatization.
Finally, the Central Vista redevelopment, a project of demolition and construction
in central Delhi, promises to remake the employees of the central government into
efficient and productive innovators. Building a new state Secretariat in the image of a
data centre, the buildings promise a hermetically networked government that intensifies
the projects of Aadhaar and the index. Even as they function as an icon for an
increasingly confident Hindu nationalist government, they use the language of
management to mask and defuse their links to Hindutva.
While these are specific case studies, these interfaces have broad-reaching effects.
They are doing important work for the government and as such are being replicated and
taken up in various domains. India Stack promises to alter healthcare, travel, payments,
and more in the image of Aadhaar, and its model is being spread around the world,
particularly in parts of Africa. The index is a viral form and in India today it is applied to
everything from water management to measuring innovation. And the Central Vista is
only one of the most visible examples of a pattern of urban redevelopment that is taking
place across the country.

World-Class Innovation
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These interfaces are simultaneously technical, entrepreneurial and aesthetic. They
continue to be animated by a familiar set of technical projects: the projects of
reorganizing how the government works, of enumerating and collecting data, of creating
ever-more efficient infrastructures for the transfer of capital and commodities. According
to anthropologist James Ferguson, who called development an “anti-politics machine”,
the discourse of development renders complex entanglements of the social, geographical
and economic as technical problems. This “rendering technical” closes off the possibility
for democratic debate and dissent and turn large domains of the political into a matter for
experts.48 How have these technical projects, in contrast to the projects described by
Ferguson, escaped the domain of experts and bureaucrats and entered the stage of the
political?
This thesis describes two major ways in which the transformation from technical
to political occurs in India today: through the medium of the entrepreneurial and the
aesthetic. Lilly Irani describes “rendering entrepreneurial” as a means by which certain
issues are designated as sites for innovation. The entrepreneurial is domain in which
social problems are treated as design challenges and become the subject of hackathons,
where innovation and creative thinking will provide agile solutions to entrenched
problems. In Irani’s account, it is the domain of “empathetic”, feminized design thinking
that takes place at development consultancies and is contrasted with a putatively
masculine “rendering technical” that is identified with technocratic states.49 Rather than
being opposed to one another, in India this thesis finds that the two are symbiotic. For
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example, the UIDAI, a state agency despite its startup performance, regularly organizes
hackathons to build applications on top of Aadhaar. And by facilitating competition the
rankings of the index are supposed to push bureaucrats to behave more like innovative
entrepreneurs. In India under maximum governance, then, the state undergirds the
entrepreneurial, by using its coercive technical apparatus to collect the data that will
enable innovation. The state making such data transparent and available for
entrepreneurship is even described as a triumph of Indian democracy.50
If the entrepreneurial refers to activities carried out under the sign of innovation, it
goes hand in hand with the aesthetic, whose leitmotif is the world class. The urban
geographer D Asher Ghertner proposes the perception of world-classness as the means by
which slum clearance decisions are made in millennial Delhi. According to Ghertner,
under constraints of urgency and in the face of an increasingly complex system of
statistics and maps, aesthetics came to replace enumeration as the principle that
determined people’s legitimate habitation in a locality. How well an area matched up to
the image of the world class determined its fate. While Ghertner’s conceptualization is
useful, rather than seeing the aesthetic as replacing the enumerative in chronological
succession, this thesis argues that enumeration itself is being rendered aesthetic.51
Irani and Ghertner both implicitly argue that the technical is an older form,
identified with the technocratic expertise of post-colonial planning and statistics, which
has withered away under contemporary neoliberalism. While this is true of certain forms
and instruments of technical knowledge, others have emerged to replace them: NITI
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Aayog’s indices, borrowed from the World Bank and other IGOs, are clearly more world
class and more supportive of innovation than the sample surveys of postcolonial
statistics. Likewise, the digital and biometric Aadhaar is a more world-class and more
innovative form of identification than the ration cards and PAN cards that it is supposed
to one day replace. These new infrastructures – that are simultaneously technical,
aesthetic and entrepreneurial – are today continually hawked in the political domain.
Rendered aesthetic and entrepreneurial, the technical is finally introduced into the
domain of the political, though within the narrow and highly managed arena of electoral
politics. This is the mechanism of managerial populism and its chief achievement. This
slippery chain of equivalences, however, can also be a site of dissent, which the
conclusion of this thesis tries to open up. The next few chapters trace a path through the
web of associations and dissimulations that characterise maximum governance, beginning
with the history of two virtues that are the cornerstone of governance: efficiency and
transparency.
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Prelude: A Genealogy of Maximum Governance
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Maximum governance’s direct precursor can be found in World Bank-sponsored
discourses of “good governance” that have been ascendant since the 1990s. Under the socalled Washington consensus that emerged after 1982, International Monetary Fund
(IMF) structural adjustment programmes imposed a standard package of free market
reforms on Third World countries regardless of their historical and social specificities.
But it soon became clear even to their supporters that these programmes, which sought to
sideline the state, were failing to bring about their desired results. By the late 1990s, for
example, former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz was arguing for a “postWashington consensus”.52 These policies had not only failed to bring about development
by their own metrics, they were also, as critical legal scholar Radha D’Souza points out,
unable to maintain the continued extraction of capital and resources from the Third
World economies they had restructured.53
Stiglitz was both echoing and responding to developments from the Global South.
At the 1989 meeting of the World Bank, for example, Manmohan Singh, the mildmannered economist who had been the chief of India’s Planning Commission and was
serving as the Secretary General of a short-lived organization called the South
Commission, was already calling for a kind of neoliberal reform “tailored to the specific
requirements of each country”.54 In the late 1980s, through the South Commission, the
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states of the Non-Aligned Movement attempted to balance the IMF-World Bank free
market approach with the state-led approach that had been followed in East Asia,
hammering out various proposals for what historian Vijay Prashad has called
“neoliberalism with Southern characteristics”.55 While none of these proposals took hold,
they lay the groundwork for “good governance” and the form of neoliberalism that
emerged in India and much of the global South.
Though India was largely able to avoid IMF-imposed austerity through the
1980s,56 an economic crisis in 1991 finally forced it to abandon the planned economy and
take a 5.7 billion dollar IMF loan with the conditions that went along with it. A country
that had been famous for its distinct model of state-led protectionism – the mixed
economy of “Nehruvian socialism” – rapidly privatised its public enterprises,
dramatically curtailed state subsidies and threw open its doors to foreign capital. When it
did so, it followed a path that hewed closer to the experiments of the South Commission
than IMF orthodoxy. Manmohan Singh was in charge, first as Finance Minister and a
decade and a half later as Prime Minster. Built on growth in the service sector
(particularly in IT) and private infrastructure development, by the mid-2000s, India’s
“success story” appeared to be part of a global trend that was also emerging in countries
like Brazil and South Africa. Under this model, excess capital was put towards social
welfare programmes, buying dominance over subaltern groups who were excluded from
economic growth in a set-up that political theorist Partha Chatterjee has called the
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“tactically extended state”.57 Though it was gentler than the IMF hard line, this “inclusive
neoliberalism” nevertheless facilitated mass dispossession and gave rise to skyrocketing
inequality.58 Responding to the success of the BRICS countries, as they came to be
called, the World Bank’s recommendations shifted from a simplistic fundamentalism of
the free market to a “reconstructed neoliberalism” with a limited recognition of the
importance of the state.59
This shift, “from market fundamentalism to governance fundamentalism”, meant
the beginning of World Bank involvement in the micromanagement of Third World
administrations.60 Good governance programmes came to replace structural adjustment
programmes as the conditions for loans. Now reforms focussed less on macreconomic
and monetary policy and more on changing processes of public administration, rule of
law, accountability and transparency to create a more favourable business environment
for investors and corporations from the global north. Good governance was the new way
to guarantee continued returns for global finance, countering movements to the left and
manage the state’s tactical extensions.
If governance fundamentalism has been a largely top-down process promoted by
intergovernmental organizations and governments (with international consultancies and
multinational corporations as their accomplices and beneficiaries), it depends on virtues
that also managed to garner broad public support on the ground. In India today, values
like transparency and efficiency, which are the cornerstone of good governance, have
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become what anthropologists Laura Bear and Nayanika Mathur call “public goods”:
desirable ideals that are “considered universally beneficial for everyone and [are] the
rationale for radical changes to bureaucratic organizations”.61 At work here is what
Michel Foucault calls “governmentality”, or the “conduct of conduct”, the ways ordinary
people are trained to take up the state’s categories in their own lives, filtering the goals of
government into everyday mentalities.62 For “minimum government, maximum
governance” to work as a slogan in BJP’s election 2014 campaign and after, governance
had to have a collective emotional charge for citizens. A significant minority of Indians
had to have a stake in values like transparency and efficiency. In order for the
aestheticization of governance to be successful, in other words, it had to have first been
governmentalized. Administrative concerns that were once arcane and wonkish had to
become meaningful to the public. This process has been in the making for decades.

Efficiency
As is well known, the postcolonial Indian state was born with technocratic tendencies.63
In 1953, Ford Foundation expert Paul Appleby was invited to India by Jawaharlal Nehru,
the Prime Minister of the newly independent nation. After touring the country for three
months Appleby, who taught public administration at Syracuse University, gave a set of
recommendations on how to improve the efficiency of the Indian administration.64
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Borrowing from the state of art in corporate management, Appleby advocated setting up a
Division of Organization and Methods (or O&M) within the Cabinet, which vetted
governmental procedures to make them more efficient. His other recommendations,
broadly motivated by an O&M approach, ranged from a wholesale restructuring of the
civil services, which did not take hold, to new procedures for handling paperwork, which
did.65 But Appleby’s most lasting contribution may have been in setting up of the Indian
Institute of Public Administration, which turned the question of governmental efficiency
into an expert discipline, to be debated at its conferences and in the pages of its journal by
scholars and civil servants. The Nehruvian period was in general a period characterised
by technocratic expertise and the question of governmental efficiency would be treated
no differently.
By the mid-1980s, the problem of governmental efficiency was being approached
differently. Rather than individual experts like Appleby proposing sweeping reforms, the
pursuit of efficiency became a problem of monitoring performance.66 In a landmark
public broadcast outlining his new government’s commitments in January 1985, the
computer-savvy Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi “asked that the decision-making
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processes should be decentralised along with enforcement of accountability. Rules and
procedures will be drastically simplified to speed up decision-making. Results will take
precedence over procedures."67 In the account of civil servant Prahlad K Basu, the
changes were being made to “bring about greater efficiency and effectiveness in the
functioning of government and to make administration more responsive, accountable and
result-oriented”.68 The careful reordering of process and structure – which earlier efforts
at reform had strived for – was being replaced by the collection of information on the
basis of which “performance” could be evaluated. Governance was taking the place of
public administration.69
Spurred on by the emergence of governmental computer networks in India after
the founding of the National Informatics Centre in 1976, a new Ministry of Programme
Implementation, founded in 1985, collected and monitored data on government projects
in an Online Computerised Management System.70 The ministry’s goal was to be a
“catalyst”, simply providing information so that organizations could make themselves
more efficient. As theorist of public administration B Guy Peters notes, this was
reflective of a global shift from traditional public administration approaches, wherein
performance was “judged primarily on legal and accounting grounds”, to approaches
derived from New Public Management, a school of administrative thought that borrowed
from techniques of corporate management, where performance was judged on
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“quantifiable indicators of the outputs of government”.71 These quantifiable indicators –
which in the 1980s were still largely internal matters – lay the basis for the current
government’s dramatization of performance.
Even as it facilitated a cybernetic imaginary of a self-correcting system,
increasingly granular performance tracking enabled the intensification of fantasies of
control and centralization that have always been a part of postcolonial development.72
The boyish Rajeev Gandhi, an Air India pilot before he was thrust into political
leadership, compared running the country to flying an aeroplane: “What fun it used to be
to fly. Now I find myself being relegated to being a Prime Minister. Although I am
strapped behind a desk, the task of moving ahead in a particular direction is not very
different. But somehow there seems to be a lot more inertia, momentum — the
instrument seems to have tremendous lag, and the controls are very sluggish”.73 This
fantasy has reached new heights under Modi’s government, which has instituted systems
for the “real-time” tracking of performance with great zeal.
While some of the concerns of efficiency haven’t changed very much since the
1950s, today they are dramatized in new ways, celebrated in newspaper exclusives: “It
has taken six years for the Narendra Modi government to push this major reform through
the bureaucracy, but finally, from next month, no central government file will pass more
than four hands before a decision and ministries will also be able to submit e-files to each
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other.”74 Efficiency has shifted from being a rarefied discourse of planning elites, buried
in reports and journals, to a public good that is advertised by politicians and cited as the
motivations for reforms. Even as increased efficiency underwrites new forms of control,
it has moved to the front of the house, a way of adjudging a relation of investment
between the state and its entrepreneurial citizens, for whom less paperwork means
smoother services and more ease of doing business.

Transparency
The economic liberalization of 1991 brought to a head trends towards a consumer society
that had been in the making throughout the 1980s. Economic reforms, along with the
widespread availability of information technologies, led to the promise of a new
relationship between the state and its citizens. Writing about e-governance initiatives in
the 1990s, anthropologist William Mazzarella argues that “after a high-modern
interregnum of impersonal and alienating bureaucratic institutions, e-governance
heralded the return – now on a national scale – of the face-to-face polis.”75 At the same
time, through the 1990s, transparency was being posed globally as the solution for
corruption in poorly governed regimes around the global South.76
The turn to transparency required nothing less than a shift in the normative ideal
of the Indian citizen. While the rural poor had been the idealized citizens of Indian
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popular politics and media in the Nehruvian period, by the 1980s, an emergent urban
consumer middle-class began to take its place.77 As India lost its socialist momentum, the
new Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi had called “for the construction of autobahns,
airfields, speedy trains, shopping malls, and entertainment centres of excellence, big
housing complexes, modern hospitals and healthcare centres.”78 In the wake of these
reforms a new breed of “middle-class activist” began to emerge in Indian cities,
demanding not only transparency but also efficiency from government services and the
clearance of slums that were deemed “nuisances”.79 Such mobilizations by a class of
consumer-citizens laid the basis for present performances of transparency under the BJP.
Beginning in the 1990s organizations like the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan
(or the Association for Empowerment of Labourers and Farmers, MKSS) began to
counter local corruption to ensure that workers were being paid fair rates. The movement
countered corruption that was often collusive between the lower bureaucracy and
workers, who would be paid less in exchange with the understanding that they would
have to work less. The organization led a campaign for a nationwide Right to Information
Act, which was passed in 2005 and became a powerful tool to demand transparency and
accountability in the state’s workings.80 While MKSS is a non-party political
organization with a broadly leftist persuasion, many of the new activists who promoted
the cause of transparency often eschewed the political ideologies of the left and the right.
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Chief among these was the India Against Corruption movement, a massive
political agitation that took place in 2010, which brought together a range of characters
including a religious leader with ties to the World Economic Forum, a Gandhian activist,
a popular TV yogi, a Delhi University political scientist, a retired police chief and a
former school teacher with political ambitions. The political party that emerged from the
movement, the Aam Aadmi Party (Common People’s Party), led by the former
schoolteacher Arvind Kejriwal, has held the majority in the National Capital Territory of
Delhi since 2012, where it is committed to a putatively de-ideologized politics of
efficiency and transparency. Calling it a “movement against politics”, political theorist
Partha Chatterjee parsed it as “a populist movement in Ernesto Laclau’s sense in which
groups with a variety of complaints and demands come together by asserting that their
demands are equivalent since they are all demands of the “people” directed against a
common “enemy.” In this case, the enemy was designated as the class of politicians and
government officials, all of whom were said to be corrupt.”81
In contrast to the rural corruption that was impacting the livelihoods of the poor
which had been centred by MKSS, the India Against Corruption movement was taken up
by an urban middle-class for whom corruption was an inconvenience and a national
shame. Technology played a central role here, with websites like ipaidabribe.com acting
as platforms to dramatize middle-class consumer-citizens’ encounters with corruption.
William Mazzarella has called this sort of transparency “crucial to the multilateral
marriage of an antipolitical politics, management theory, and corporate infotech”.82 The

81
82

Chatterjee, “The Movement against Politics,” 118.
Mazzarella, “Internet X-Ray,” 489.

Samdub 41
“technomoral” language of the AAP, “mixing technocratic languages of law and policy
with moral pronouncements”, set the stage for the BJP’s embrace of transparency and
accountability as its own platform.83
In the run up to the 2014 elections, a group of savvy young managerial
professionals who supported Modi echoed the AAP’s calls for accountable governance.
As Sunil Khilnani puts it, “the real masterminds of Modi’s political campaigns are not
shadowy figures wearing RSS uniform under their plainclothes. They are smart, cheery
IIT-ians [alumni of Indian Institutes of Technology]”84. A group that called themselves
the Citizens for Accountable Governance (or CAG) sought to project Modi as a dynamic
pro-business leader. The group “chose their name in a nod to … the national auditor [the
Comptroller Auditor General, with which it shares an acronym], which called attention to
corruption during a time of Congress party-led government.”85 It was largely successful
in its projection of Modi as a pro-business technocrat. The uneasy coupling of
transparency and efficiency, then, composed the technomoral core around which Modi
broadened his appeal beyond Hindutva to a neoliberal, globalized aspirational urban
middle-class.86
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“The Aadhaar programme has now conclusively proven that we need not look only to the
Silicon Valleys of the world for cutting-edge innovation in technology. Government is an
equally fertile environment in which to build such solutions, not as an end in itself but as
a means to improve the lives of all 1.2 billion of our fellow Indians.”87
-

Nandan Nilekani

“’Honey,’ I confided, ‘I think the world is flat.’
How did I come to this conclusion? I guess you could say it all started in Nandan
Nilekani's conference room at Infosys Technologies Limited”
-

Thomas Friedman

Little Aadhaar, Big Aadhaar
At first glance, the Aadhaar biometric identification project appears to have been laid out
impeccably in advance. In stark contrast to the fickleness of most government schemes,
which are subject to the vagaries of political will, according to its proponents the project
was designed from the beginning. Aadhaar, meaning “foundation” in various Indian
languages, has been hailed as “the world’s most ambitious and biggest social inclusion

87

Nilekani and Shah, Rebooting India.

Samdub 45
program”.88 Begun in 2009, by 2020 Aadhaar had enrolled the fingerprints and retinal
scans of over 90% of India’s population of 1.3 billion into a centralised database. In
exchange for scans of their fingerprints and irises, each Indian is assigned a unique 12digit number. Today, the combination of this number and biometrics is an inescapable
part of life in India and undergirds private enterprises as well as government services.
Aadhaar’s billionaire architect Nandan Nilekani is hailed as a visionary. In
neoliberal columnist Thomas Friedman’s words: “Silicon Valley has ‘Steve’ – as in Jobs.
Seattle has ‘Bill’ – as in Gates. Omaha has ‘Warren’ – as in Buffett. And Bangalore has
‘Nandan’ – as in Nilekani.”89. Nandan’s 2015 book, Rebooting India, lays out a detailed
vision of how the entire system of Indian government can be remade in the model of
Aadhaar. Chapters are devoted to healthcare, voting, government welfare, highway tolls,
and even a plan for “a new federal structure”. Many of these schemes are currently
underway. The legendary founder of Indian tech giant Infosys treats the nation-state,
reduced primarily to its economy, as a design problem with neat outcomes and cute
diagrams.90
Yet despite the image of a grand plan laid out in advance, Aadhaar’s designers
have also been nimble and agile – to use their own language – in response to changing
realities. Questions of public policy are approached with the bluster of a Silicon Valley
elevator pitch: “When in the meeting I committed 600 million [enrolments] by March
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2014, I had no clue how to get there. It’s a happy situation that we comfortably surpassed
it.”91 Developmental problems are treated as “ten grand challenges” that can be solved by
“dedicated teams of hundred” working in “ten startups in government”. The intractable
problems of the postcolonial nation-state are approached with the logic of a hackathon.
Aadhaar is a paradigmatic case of what Evgeny Morozov calls “technical solutionism”,
an approach to the world that regards social and political issues as problems to be
solved.92
A CEO with statesmanly ambitions, Nilekani adapted quickly to Modi’s election.
In his first book, 2009’s Imagining India, when Modi was still a regional politician,
Nilekani disparaged “all his baggage and his unappealing Hindutva triumphalism”93,
where the “baggage” in question was the fact that as Chief Minister of Gujarat he
presided over a pogrom that resulted in the ethnic cleansing of over 2000 Muslims. In the
2014 elections, Nilekani ran a failed bid for office as a candidate of the opposition
Congress Party. But by the time his second book was published in 2015, when Modi was
Prime Minister, all references to Hindutva had been dropped, and Modi was enthroned at
the very top of the new design of the nation-state: “we firmly believe … that all we need
is a start-up in government to address every grand challenge we face…in order to ensure
that these projects do no sink under the weight of bureaucratic gravity, it is essential that
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they be anchored under the national leader, the prime minister.”94 As Nilekani puts it, he
“would rather be right than righteous”.95
[Figure 1]
But beyond the images of nimbleness and the agility, Media scholar Ashish
Rajadhyaksha has argued that “creep”, the gradual widening of its use beyond its initial
purpose, has always been built into Aadhaar. According to Rajadhyaksha, Aadhaar has
always been two creatures: a “Little Aadhaar” that is “lithe, lean-and-mean, up front and
visible, and a massively data-guzzling Big Aadhaar lurking in the shadows”.96 This
“ghost-image effect” is particularly powerful in matters of citizenship, where from behind
the façade of a Little Aadhaar that is apparently agnostic to all markers of culture and
identity a Big Aadhaar occasionally emerges, using the forms of enumeration and
targeting offered by Aadhaar to render Muslims and other minorities as intruders in the
nation.97 This doubleness is also at work in the “financial inclusion assemblage”, whose
proponents have maintained that Aadhaar is nothing more than a voluntary,
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“minimalistic” means of verifying identity while also claiming it as the basis for a new
form of development.98

Financial Inclusion and Actually Existing Entrepreneurship
Aadhaar’s scope has slowly but surely expanded, from an initial proposal for making
government services more efficient to a plan to entirely reorganize the Indian economy
and nation under the sign of “financial inclusion”. In its initial articulation, Aadhaar,
known simply as UID (Universal Identity Document), was supposed to address
corruption and “leakages” in the Indian welfare system by verifying the identity of
welfare recipients. Nilekani’s first book, published in 2009, doesn’t mention the phrase
“financial inclusion” even once. Though he was clearly already interested in what urban
theorist Ananya Roy calls “poverty capital” – a way of “doing well by doing good” to use
a phrase from management guru CK Prahalad99 – he had not yet settled on financial
inclusion as his modus operandi.100 Before long, the promise of financial inclusion – and
the promise of improving the conditions of life of the poor rather than simply improving
government efficiency – came to be central to Aadhaar.
While interventions to bring banking to the poor have taken place since the AllIndia Rural Credit Surveys of the 1950s, these efforts took on a new character in the
1990s and 2000s. In this period microfinance efforts were first routed through Women’s
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Self Help Groups and then through “non-banking financial institutions” modelled on the
experiments of Mohammed Yunus, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2006 for
inventing microcredit, a form of small-scale lending that was taken up across the global
south as a preferred form of developmental intervention.101 By the late 2000s, following
the publication of a report on financial inclusion by the Rangarajan Committee and a
microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was encouraging
mainstream banks to enter microfinance, to open new branches in small towns and to
create new banking products aimed at financial inclusion. For the RBI, financial inclusion
included having a checking account, a savings account, a credit card and being able to
use the bank system to send and receive money.102
But identity was a problem for mainstream banks, as unlike more informal and
local banking systems, their formalized systems could not depend on social relationships
to verify identity. Instead, they needed codified markers like photographs, addresses and
biometrics that could function at a national scale. Aadhaar pitched itself as the answer to
this problem. By 2012, the ability to verify identity based on Aadhaar was expanded to
private companies, allowing them to use Aadhaar to comply with the government’s
Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements. Globally, stringent KYC requirements had
been promoted by the US government in the wake of 9/11, putatively to clamp down on
money laundering for terrorism.103 While KYC requirements for opening a bank account,
acquiring a SIM card or registering for a government programme previously required the
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submission of multiple forms, proofs of address and identity, passport photographs and so
on, in the wake of Aadhaar, fingerprint-based biometric authentication takes care of all
these requirements. In place of messy, slow paper-based documents submitted in
duplicate, a fingerprint could instantly verify that you are who you say you are.104 The
success of Aadhaar in facilitating KYC processes meant that it had a strong position in
determining the course of financial inclusion. As a result, MS Sriram argues, the RBI’s
comprehensive definition of financial inclusion, which included savings accounts and
credit cards, was largely abandoned and the major focus of financial inclusion efforts
became micropayment transactions, which could also be facilitated by Aadhaar.105 To use
Ashish Rajadhyaksha’s turn of phrase, Aadhaar became “the cog that sought to define the
wheel itself”.106
By December 2009, Nilekani had been invited to head the new Unique
Identification Development Authority of India (UIDAI). At a meeting between the
UIDAI, Reserve Bank of India, the National Payments Corporation of India and “all
major banks”, the link between Aadhaar, the banking system and “micropayments” – the
basis of financial inclusion – was chalked out.107 In 2010, the landmark UIDAI report
“Creating a Unique Identity Number for Every Resident in India” dedicated a small
section towards the end to “one of the potential applications of the UID – the use of the
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number in driving financial inclusion, and in enabling a micropayments solution that the
poor can use to access financial services”.108 By the publication of Nilekani’s second
book in 2015, “financial inclusion”, by now reshaped around microtransactions, was the
key to the nation’s developmental problems: “a nation cannot progress when a huge
number of its citizens are cut off from accessing the fruits of the country’s
development.”109
Microtransactions infrastructures were gradually added to Aadhaar. The AadhaarEnabled Payments System (AEPS) was launched in 2011, enabling the government to
disburse welfare directly into recipients’ bank accounts (opened smoothly using
Aadhaar’s KYC technology). The possibility of doing so changed the welfare landscape
dramatically, with so-called “Direct Benefit Transfer” being promoted everywhere as an
alternative to in-kind welfare disbursements. Instead of receiving grains or gas cylinders,
the plan was for welfare recipients to receive money directly in their bank accounts.
AEPS was followed in 2016 by Unified Payments Interface (UPI), a protocol that can be
used by private players for interoperable microtransactions and has been the foundation
of some of India’s biggest and most celebrated tech “unicorns”, enabling them to create
payments apps like PayTM and PhonePe.
Seeing Indian capitalism as “lacking”, Aadhaar aimed to transform not-yetcapitalist – in Nilekani’s words, “feudal” – subjects into proper capitalist consumers.110
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Financial inclusion would not be about helping the poor build up savings but lubricating
the exchange of money within a consumer economy. In the 1980s and 1990s, advertising
was a major site through which Indians were “trained” to be proper capitalist consumers,
often resulting in alignments between the state and large corporations.111 Instead of
training consumers through images, the preferred modality of Aadhaar-enabled financial
inclusion is the creation of a new interface, an intervention in the infrastructure of
exchange itself. Rather than an incomplete capitalism being conceived of as a problem of
purchasing habits, it had become a problem of creating new, non-leaky channels between
the state, corporations and citizens. A World Bank blog post lays it out baldly: “Digital
ID systems can help companies reduce operating costs associated with regulatory
compliance (e.g., electronic know-your customer—eKYC), widen customer bases,
generate new markets, and foster a business-friendly environment more broadly.”112 As a
technology that is capable of transforming the unbanked into the banked – by facilitating
KYC – Aadhaar constitutes the category of the unbanked as the problem to be fixed
through eradication.
While the proponents of financial inclusion argue that informality is a problem of
visibility (globally, digital IDs are promoted as a way of formalizing the “invisible
billion”113), the vast majority of people enrolled in Aadhaar already had some form of
official ID and had been counted for over a century in India’s decennial census.114 The
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rhetorical thrust of Aadhaar’s attempted destruction of informality builds on widespread
notions of informality as “a domain of survival by the poor and marginalized”.115 But as
recent scholarship – especially of cities in the global South – reminds us, spaces of
informal exchange are often sites of resistance, persistence and innovation with thriving
commerce and entrepreneurship. Even in environments saturated with digitality, where
access is not a problem of exclusion, informality continues to persist, often in ways that
theorists find particularly hopeful.116 Contrary to the rhetoric of financial inclusion, as
James C Scott argues, informality itself is not necessarily a source of exclusion; rather, it
is often a way of coping with inequality and uneven development.117
Rather than referring to an empirical condition, urban theorist Ananya Roy argues
that informality is a designation of exception that suspends the normal order: “the state
has the power to determine what is informal and what is not, and to determine which
forms of informality will thrive and which will disappear”.118 The designation of vast
parts of the population of India as “informal” is contiguous with a range of forms of
exception that the state uses to legitimise various interventions, from slum clearances to
digital identity projects. As Ananya Vajpeyi argues, “informal workers, landless peasants,
casual labor, dispossessed farmers driven by new global trade régimes to mass suicide,
tribals at the receiving end of ecocidal development, the slumdwelling urban poor, illegal
immigrants from neighboring nations, riot survivors, ‘oustees’, ‘detainees’, and victims
of insurgent and separatist movements forced to relocate within the country”, all exist in
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states of exception against which formal society and economy are constructed.119 But far
from rescuing them from a state of precarity, the concrete processes of “financial
inclusion” consecrate the informal as a new site for state-facilitated extraction.
By 2015, Nilekani was advocating the Aadhaar approach – where a “startup
within a state” builds infrastructure and protocols for governmental and private use – as a
way of reorganizing all domains of the country’s governance. In 2016, with the Modi
government’s commitment to “Digital India” now well under way, this approach was
formalized as “India Stack”. A set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), India
Stack was developed by the think tank Indian Software Product Industry Roundtable
(iSPIRT), a relatively new industry body whose mission is to transform the Indian tech
industry from a focus on services for overseas clients to consumer products for a new
generation of internet-enabled Indians, turning India into a “Product Nation”. Its initial
website promoted the creation of India Stack as “similar to the creation of the Internet”,
enabling “private players [to] focus on building customer facing solutions that ride on
India Stack”.120 Among iSPIRT’s volunteers were many designers of Aadhaar and former
UIDAI employees who were now cashing in on the system they had built. Vinod Khosla,
the Silicon Valley venture capitalist who Forbes has called “one of the most influential
people in business”, was at the forefront of opening Aadhaar up for commercial use.121
Recently, Nilekani has contrasted the Western model of the internet, which is
fuelled by advertising and led to the emergence of Google and Facebook’s “surveillance
capitalism”, with an Indian transaction-fuelled model that supposedly empowers “micro119
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entrepreneurs”. “The West created monopolies, we democratised data”, he says in one
interview.122 Aadhaar had completed its transition from a technology to provide welfare
more efficiently to the foundation of a state-led model for reconciling development and
private profit. For Nilekani, entrepreneurialism and innovation is the promise of
“democratization”, supposedly throwing open previously inscrutable techno-managerial
systems that existed in the domain of experts to the people.
Despite the promise of financial inclusion and microentrepreneurship, the actors
that have benefited the most from Aadhaar and the India Stack have been a small coterie
of Bangalore elites, the country’s largest banks and telecommunications companies, and
the odd startup. According to India Stack’s current, much glossier website, the use of
Aadhaar for KYC, for example, drove down costs for onboarding new customers for
banks from $23 per customer to $.15.123 Meanwhile, Aadhaar enabled payments fuelled
the rise of some of the country’s biggest startups, the micropayments apps Paytm and
PhonePe. The combination of Aadhaar-enabled KYC and creative misreadings of
regulations enabled mobile phone network Reliance Jio to enrol more than a million
customers a day, making its parent company Reliance India Limited (already one of the
country’s biggest corporations) the most valuable company in India and its director
Mukesh Ambani the richest person in Asia.124 Business journalist Harish Damodaran
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points out that Indian capitalism after 2014 is characterised more than ever before by
large conglomerates that align themselves with the state’s policy goals.125 And as he
points out elsewhere, all these corporate houses continue to be owned and run by India’s
traditional business castes.126 Journalist Aria Thaker characterises the enrichment of these
actors though Aadhaar as a system that “mix[es] public risk and private profit”.127

Targeting, or the Ontology of the Parasite128
According to Aadhaar’s proponents, the Indian government’s welfare systems were
corrupt, inefficient, and plagued by “leakages”. As Aadhaar’s semi-official biographer
Shankar Aiyar puts it: “successive governments crafted public programmes for the needy
but found benefits being cornered, if not captured by the politically muscular.”129 These
“leakages” were identified as one of the main reasons that governmental welfare, the
instruments of the tactically extended state, were failing to eradicate poverty. Devesh
Kapur and his collaborators, for example, argued that as much as 70% of total benefits
disbursed by the state were being lost to leakages.130 According to Aadhaar’s proponents,
a form of unique identification was necessary in order to verify that welfare benefits were
only going to their deserving, intended recipients. The use of biometrics – fingerprints
and retina scans – which could definitively identify a body promised to put an end to
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fraud in the system and make it far more efficient and transparent.131 The promise of
biometric identification would afford the possibility of efficiently and effectively
targeting benefits, so that welfare could be directly disbursed to intended beneficiaries
and no one else.
Aadhaar’s threat model has strong resonances with the mid-20th theory of
communication that is foundational to modern computing. The mathematician and
cryptographer Claude Shannon theorised communications systems where a message
would be encoded into information to be sent and decoded upon receipt.132 Though
Shannon’s most recognizable legacy may be his coinage of the words “bit” and “byte”,
his system simplified and codified how we understand information flows and enabled
many of the innovations of the rise of computing. Shannon was obsessed with
interferences that threatened the flow and fidelity of information. Communication was
always in danger of being interrupted by noise or, in his work on cryptography in World
War II, intercepted by an enemy agent. Under the reign of Aadhaar, government welfare
is conceived of similarly, primarily as a communications infrastructure that creates a
channel between state and citizen, a pipe that must be protected against outside factors.133
Aadhaar offers the promise of differentiating between signal and noise, between the
intended recipient of benefits and the enemy agent – or undeserving freeloader – who is
waiting to intercept it.
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But even as Aadhaar afforded the ability to distinguish between the deserving
recipient of welfare and an undeserving, corrupt “politically muscular” figure whose
parasitism was supposedly a major drain on governmental finances, it also always
afforded the possibility of making other distinctions. As Ashish Rajadhyaksha has argued
the project of Aadhaar has always been co-produced with the far more invasive project of
the National Population Register, which changes how citizenship is defined in
postcolonial India.134 And according to researcher Srinivas Kodali, Aadhaar’s promise of
identification was simultaneously designed to assuage fears of the figure of the Muslim
other that emerged as a threat after the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan as
well as the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008.135 Aadhaar, then, operationalizes a generalized
fear of an interloper: its fundamental affordance is the exclusion of a threatening other,
whether it is the undeserving welfare freeloader and the Muslim terrorist or the
Bangladeshi migrant. This is well captured by the military self-description of one of
Aadhaar’s early biometric contractors: “American and foreign military services, defense
and intelligence agencies rely on L-1 solutions and services to help determine ally from
enemy.”136
Philosopher Michel Serres builds on Shannon, among other sources, to argue that
society is a cascade of parasitic relations. Enemy agents interrupt messages that were not
intended for them, capitalists extract surplus value from the production of workers, and
humans are parasitic upon the natural world for sustenance and resources. Parasitism –
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which can be either positive or negative depending on context – is both a “nocturnal”,
hidden process as well as “the most common thing in the world”. It is a relation that
enables transactions and translations across different orders of being: as Serres puts it, the
parasite “obtains energy and pays for it in information. He obtains the roast and pays for
it in stories”.137 In claiming to interrupt the parasites in the existing welfare system,
Aadhaar simply erects new relations of parasitism. In place of the leakage of welfare by
the undeserving, Aadhaar substitutes the extraction of information in exchange for goods
or services by the state and corporations. The promise of effecting the more efficient
disbursal of benefits has led to the extraction of biometric data that is put to many other
uses, whether it is private profit or the targeting of Muslims.
Even as Aadhaar used the threat of the leak to “onboard” the informal into the
formal, and to distinguish legitimate citizen from dangerous interloper, it has not been
successful in addressing the actual leakages in the system. A randomized-control trial run
by the Jamal Abdul Latif Poverty Action Lab, a development research agency founded by
Nobel laureates Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee, found that the introduction of
Aadhaar led to no improvement in so-called leakages. The study concluded that
“Aadhaar-based authentication of transactions had no measurable benefit”.138 The
strongest motivating factor in the uptake of Aadhaar-based micropayments was not the
threat of leakage but so-called “demonetization”, when Modi announced without warning
in November 2016 that the largest-denomination currency notes would be withdrawn
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from circulation, ostensibly to eliminate the untaxed cash circulating in the underground
economy. Demonetization caused long lines at ATMs and currency shortages for months,
reduced India’s GDP growth rate by more than one percentage point and caused the loss
of 1.5 million jobs. The Reserve Bank of India later found that the move had a negligible
impact on black money.139 But between December 2016 and September 2017, UPI-based
transactions increased exponentially, from 2 to 30 million transactions per day.140 In early
2017, after PayTM’s traffic had tripled in the last three months, a video emerged of the
startup’s CEO dancing, swearing and gloating on stage at the company’s annual party.141
The cashless economy had arrived.

“Government will disappear”: Caste and citizen experience

"For most people, interacting with the state is a stressful and arduous task.
Standing in long queues, the lack of access to information, waiting endlessly for
rations, negotiating with corrupt officials -- these are just some of the irritants,
both major and minor, that people must deal with. Is there a way we can
smoothen out these bumps, in effect rendering the state "invisible" to the people"”
(Nilekani and Shah 289)
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Nilekani’s writerly persona is that of a man who has repeatedly come up against and been
frustrated by the state, an effective basis for establishing solidarity with the middle-class
reading public for books by business leaders. After his reforms, in his ideal world, “in
effect, government will disappear from people’s everyday lives; instead of taking the
physical form of offices and bureaucrats, government will now be evident only through
the delivery of its services and their outcomes.”142 The people and paper and buildings
that make up the documentary state will be gone.
While this animosity towards the physical – and particularly towards the state – is
a core part of a global tech discourse in general and of biometrics in particular, it also has
strong casteist valences within in India. Since the Mandal Commission reforms of 1990,
the Indian state has been the site of one of the strongest affirmative action (or
“reservation”) policies in the world, setting aside major quotas for people with
marginalized caste backgrounds in public jobs and universities. While this has been an
important development in delivering on the promise of Indian democracy, it has also led
to a strong backlash from upper-caste groups. As historian Ajanta Subramanian
demonstrates, the Indian Institutes of Technology, the postcolonial technical universities
that are celebrated as the basis of India’s IT revolution – where Nilekani and much of his
coterie studied – were major sites in which strategies of casteist exclusion were
developed. Central to upper-caste strategy is a discourse that positions marginalized caste
people as unmeritorious, undeserving of the increasingly prominent positions that
reservations have brought them in Indian politics, education and government.143
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Both of Nilekani’s books are peppered with disparaging references to
marginalized caste politicians, who are portrayed as corrupt and self-serving, and to
policies of reservations, which “transform us from a society into partisans of caste and
minority”.144 Like many liberals whose normative view of democratic politics is based on
a mythic Western Europe, Nilekani sees these instances of increasing equality as
examples of “feudal” politics that hold India back from “a politics that is based on
ideas.”145 Read against the history of reservations, which is co-emergent with the
economic reforms of 1991, Aadhaar’s promise of disappearing the government should be
understood not only as classic pro-market neoliberal move but also as a rearguard action
against the increasing – though still deeply lacking – empowerment of marginalized
castes in India. In the chain of equivalences that characterises managerial populism, it
does not take a great leap of the imagination to identify the undeserving beneficiary of
the welfare leak with the undeserving marginalized caste beneficiary of government
affirmative action programmes. Historian Ravinder Kaur sums up neatly: “The incessant
calls for minimum government are rooted in this double edged anxiety of quota versus
merit and government versus market.”146
Nilekani argues that technology can make a dramatic intervention in this system,
He writes,
"traditionally, government has bought and used technology simply as a tool to
automate processes—maintaining electronic instead of paper records, for
example—but the citizen experience remains largely unaltered. This is not what
144
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we mean by a technology-enabled solution. We are talking about radically
reimagining government, its purpose, its role and the way it carries out its
functions, with technology at its core."147
Clearly drawing from the design idea of user experience, wherein effective interfaces are
supposed to disappear to their users, “citizen experience” envisions a new way in which
the state and citizens would relate. According to anthropologist Vijayanka Nair a new
conception of time is central to this promise: “Aadhaar’s promise of state facilitated
identity verification ‘anytime-anywhere’ undoubtedly seeks to alter the spatial
characteristics commonly attributed to the state. … [into] … an entity that acquiesces to
appearing and retreating ‘anywhere’, and at the behest of the Aadhaar holder.”148 Yet
messy reality is often not so cooperative with such visions of an smooth, overhauled
citizen experience. Nair argues that “‘instantaneity’ is often a carefully orchestrated,
laborious artefact whose production is invisibilised”.149 The effortless citizen experience
promised by Aadhaar is in reality often labourious and dysfunctional, a glossy veneer that
is made possible by the everyday improvisations of the most precarious members of this
order, lower bureaucrats and welfare recipients, like a local official in a village without
mobile phone signal who makes welfare recipients accompany him to the top of a hill to
seek out mobile data to validate their biometrics.
In cybertime, all but the most egregious failures are read by the system as
successes. When a fingerprint fails to authenticate, people can be denied food or money
that means the difference between life and death. In 2018, UIDAI claimed that the
147
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authentication failure rates were 13%. However, this figure only counted failures as those
events when authentication didn’t take place even after repeated attempts. Independent
surveys by activist and civil society groups have showed that failure rates are often as
high as 60%, with cases where people have tried to scan their fingerprints 25 times before
meeting with “success”, with the entire process of accessing welfare taking many hours
more hours than it had previously.150 Working class people whose thumbprints are worn
through manual labour have the worst of this system. In the worst of cases, these failed
authentications have led to in deaths due to hunger, because welfare beneficiaries have
been denied their monthly entitlement of food grains, with one tally counting half of all
starvation deaths recorded in India between 2015 and 2018 being related to Aadhaar.151
And under the Aadhaar model since most people involved in the “last mile” provision of
welfare and services are not government servants but independent contractors who are
not even nominally accountable to the public, there are few if any channels of redress.152
When such situations occur, the invisibility of the state is a barrier to life. The smooth
citizen experience of the rich and the middle-class are sources of “slow violence” to
citizens who must take on the burden for a broken infrastructure.153
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“I believe that we need uniform global standards so that cross-border transactions,
collaborations and partnerships are not hampered. We need ultimately and I hope
India can lead the way to a uniform UPI or a Uniform Payments Interface. India’s
Aadhaar can lead the way to a Uniform Aadhaar for all the 7 billion people so that
every person on this earth is uniquely identified and India leads the way and that’s the
opportunity”
-

Mukesh Ambani

“How India created the blueprint for the economies of the future”, declares the subtitle of
an article written by two iSPIRT “volunteers”, comparing India Stack with blockchains
and cryptocurrencies in their transformative potential.154 In the last few years, attempts
have been underway to export Aadhaar and the India Stack’s formula to reconcile
development, profit and centralization to other locales in the global South. The
development and promotion of the India Stack model has aligned with the rise of a global
network promoting digital identification and “digital public goods” for development.
In 2014, the World Bank launched its Identification for Development (ID4D)
project. The project, targeted at the “invisible billion”, has aggressively promoted the
uptake of digital identity systems in the Global South as a panacea for development,
having disbursed over $1 billion in funding to set up new identity systems in over 45
countries. Some form of identification, in the form of civil registration, has been a United
Nations human right since 1966, when the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights was adopted by the General Assembly. The Covenant held that “every child shall
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be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name”. Regimes of civil
registration are the norm in the Global North and are also widespread in many countries
in the developing world. Largely overlooked for a long time as a staid part of the state’s
routine administrative work, civil registration was reanimated in the mid 2000s as the
missing link in a model of development based on the arguments of Hernando de Soto, the
Peruvian economist who advocated formalizing property rights as a pathway to
development. In an influential article Cambridge historian Simon Szreter argued for civil
registration’s centrality to proposals for financial inclusion and the formalization of
capital:
“those who, like De Soto and the World Bank, are seeking to foster economic
development and the expansion of market activity in countries like those of Latin
America or Africa today through a … need to start by empowering individuals
with an accessible and secure system for registering their own identities. The
machinery of civil, vital registration is a necessary practical complement to De
Soto’s emphasis on the need for property title laws and agencies of enforcement
to enable all in society—not just the rich—to mobilize their assets into capital.”155
The ID4D movement that has arisen since Szreter’s article and in the aftermath of
Aadhaar exploits a blurriness between civil registration, which is a UN-recognized
human right, and biometric identification databases, which is a specific way of
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implementing civil registration that, according to Nishant Shah create new forms of
subjecthood that don’t represent pre-biometric subjects so much as replace them.156
Unlike most programmes of civil registration, Aadhaar and its World Bankfunded clones have played out largely in the legal limbo that is characteristic of projects
of “extrastatecraft”.157 Between 2009 and 2017, when an Aadhaar Act was finally passed
as a “money bill”, a legislative tool that exempted it from the usual parliamentary
debates, the project functioned in the absence of a statutory or regulatory framework.
India still has a weak legal framework governing the sharing, storage, sale and
monetization of the kind of sensitive personal data that Aadhaar stores. Much of the
activist opposition to Aadhaar in India consisted of attempts to bring it under legal
oversight and have it declared unconstitutional by the courts. As similar systems are
promoted across the world, they occasionally come up against a strong legal opposition,
as in Kenya, where the Hudumba Namba ID system was struck down by the courts for its
surveillance risk. Anticipating such setbacks, the World Bank has gone as far as to
explicitly recommend implementing such projects in advance of legal foundations. The
project assessment document for the West Africa Unique Identification for Regional
Integration and Inclusion programme states: “The project does not want to risk
unforeseen hindrances by … legislating something prematurely.”158 Even as they claim to
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stamp out the illegal and the informal, most regimes of digital ID operate by design on
the edge of formality and legality.
In 2019 a striking combination of states, an intergovernmental organization and
an Indian thinktank – the governments of Norway and Sierra Leone, UNICEF and the
iSPIRT, the developer of India Stack – founded the Digital Public Goods Alliance
(DPGA) to promote “digital public goods”, a new form of development intervention.
Digital public goods were defined as “open-source software, open data, open AI models,
open standards, and open content that adhere to privacy and other applicable laws and
best practices, do no harm by design, and help attain the Sustainable Development
Goals”.159 If Aadhaar was being used as a model by the ID4D movement, the DPGA
sought to offer the entire India Stack package, along with similar projects from
elsewhere, to the world as a complete model of development. Today the DPGA’s
membership has grown to include international foundations like the Gates Foundation,
the Rockefeller Foundation and Omidyar; IGOs like the World Bank, UNDP and the
Food and Agriculture Organization; the governments of Germany, Finland and Estonia;
and Nandan Nilekani’s very own eGov Foundation. Meanwhile, a UN High Level Panel
on Digital Cooperation, chaired by Alibaba founder Jack Ma and global philanthropist
Melinda Gates, has endorsed the DPGA’s approach in a report titled “The Age of Digital
Interdependence”.160
The promotion of Aadhaar and India Stack as models for the developing world
herald the emergence of what design theorist Benjamin Bratoon calls a “hemispherical
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stack” of development in the Global South. Bratton uses the concept of a hemispherical
stack to theorize the Balkanization of the internet that has been underway in the last 10
years. Like digital public goods, hemispheric stacks are composed of technologies,
protocols and regulations, often promoted by states but also by large corporations, that
are reordering geopolitics and sovereignty in the 21st century. They are characterised by
“a consolidation of computational networks into a handful of transnational blocs which in
turn comes to define the external boundaries and internal governance of those blocs and
their geopolitical positions.”161 Bratton describes three hemispherical stacks: a US stack
centred around Google Facebook and Apple, a Chinese stack outlined by state firewalls
and a EU stack modelled by regulatory initiatives. Unlike these three, the hemispherical
stack of biometric identity is addressed directly to concerns of development and the
integration of new, previously unbanked and unconnected users into the fold of digital
capitalism. Like other stacks, however, through the deployment of technical platforms
and protocols, Aadhaar and India Stack are already becoming infrastructures to reorient
sovereignty and the role of states and publics at a geopolitical level.

Out From the Zone
At the beginning of Nilekani’s first book, a businessman from New York visits the
Infosys campus in Bangalore. Impressed by Infosys but disappointed by the state of the
rest of India the visitor asks “If you can have such good roads in the Infosys campus, why
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are the roads outside so terrible?”162 While the UIDAI is officially headquartered in New
Delhi, Aadhaar’s spiritual home can be found in the Infosys campus and other similar
spaces of exception that are ubiquitous in India and around the world. Special economic
zones, free trade zones, education cities, software technology parks: these gated,
segregated urban forms that have expanded rapidly since the 1980s have birthed Aadhaar
and the aspirations of world class innovation that it hooks into. Keller Easterling calls
such spaces “zones”, sites for a distinctive experiment in “incentivised urbanism” over
the past half fifty-odd years163.
A converse to Ananya Roy’s characterisation of slums and villages as sites of
calculated informality, the zone might be considered a site of calculated formality. Many
zones are characterised by hyper-visibility yet are also spaces of covert and subterranean
exemption: in zones, gleaming skylines legitimate the suspension of labour laws, tax
regulations, and environmental protections. The Infosys campus has a “huge putting
green”, a “resort-size swimming pool”, “multiple restaurants and a fabulous health club”;
the smooth roads are a far cry from the potholed streets outside; and “glass-and-steel
buildings seem to sprout up like weeds each week”164. Yet such zones depend on armies
of precarious labour from the surrounding areas, and Infosys and its competitors haven’t
paid any taxes on their overseas earnings in decades.165
This dynamic of visibility and invisibility, in which the high-tech artifacts of
global modernity are rendered highly visible while the attendant state-legitimized
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precarity is rendered unnoticeable, is mirrored by the distinction between the hyper
visible Little Aadhaar and the more shadowy Big Aadhaar. As William Mazzarella notes
of older e-governance initiatives, projects for transparency produce corresponding
opacities.166 Through Aadhaar, the double dynamic which characterises the zone is being
exported to the rest of the country and the world. Reflecting the site in which it was
incubated, Aadhaar is a technology for making uneven extraction and its attendant
violence not only legitimate but desirable. For its proponents, Aadhaar is supposed to
extend the glossy high-tech modernity of the zone to the rest of the nation. Yet it also
extends the zone’s logics of uneven development into new ways of extracting data and
capital and creating new forms of securitization.
Even as Aadhaar extends certain of the zone’s logics, it signals a shift away from
the clear segregations that characterise the zone. If the zone was the beachhead of a
global capital that was always entering from elsewhere, Aadhaar turns citizens into
addressable users to render the lives, habits and bodies of Indians as sites for targeting,
extraction and selective exclusion without the need for the differentiated space of the
zone.167 As media theorist Nishant Shah has argued, in its promise to identify subjects,
Aadhaar facilitated the creation of a new kind of subject as an assemblage of data.168 It is
this “data subject” and “quantified self”, spread across various databases, rather than a
body in the world, that is targeted by Aadhaar. This avatar of the human subject can be
targeted not only as a deserving welfare recipient but also as a voter in elections, and as
Muslim or a putative outsider to the nation-state. In the time of targeting, the blunt and
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blanket exclusions of the zone are replaced by Aadhaar’s flexible, agile forms of
exception, more efficient at enabling the extraction of capital, perhaps, but no less
violent.169
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“We don’t do this for World Bank’s sake, we do it for our sake. Because we are a very
large country, we are bigger than twenty five countries of Europe. And therefore every
state of India must become easy and simple. And therefore we started ranking our
states.”170
-- Amitabh Kant, CEO, National Institution for Transforming India

Since 2014, the territorial divisions of the nation-state have been taken up as the site of a
distinctive experiment in mediated governance. Projects such as the Aspirational Districts
Programme, the Composite Water Management Index, the Sustainable Development
Goals Index, the Agriculture Transformation Index, the India Innovation Index, and the
Multidimensional Poverty Index use the index – a particular type of number that has been
ascendant in global governance for the past decade – to score and rank states and districts
on development outcomes. They combine the bland technocratic managerialism of World
Bank-style good governance with narratives of an aspirational, innovative and
transforming nation. Equal parts enumerative form and public relations apparatus, these
indices are dramatized in publicly-accessible real-time dashboards, policy briefs, press
reports, and social media posts as organs of “cooperative and competitive federalism”. In
spite of their supporters’ claims, indices are far from neutral, transparent or objective
measures of performance. Rather, they are infrastructures that render development as the
site of a pernicious combination of state power and entrepreneurship.
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The index (and the associated indicator) is a technology of enumeration that has
proliferated rapidly around the world in the past twenty years. Indicators, anthropologist
Sally Engle Merry and her collaborators argue, enable “the quiet exercise of power”
which is largely undeclared but powerfully shapes policy.171 They are part of a “new
avalanche of numbers” that characterizes global governance based on the production and
regulation of information.172
The BJP under Modi has been a particularly adept participant in this global
indicator culture, aggressively pursuing international rankings such as the World Bank’s
Ease of Doing Business Index. More innovatively, the BJP has transposed the work of
indices to the federal scale within India, creating alignments between actors, interests and
infrastructures at global, national, and regional scales.173 The rescaling of the global
technology of the index to the domestic sphere attempts to give NITI Aayog a hold over
states of this “very large country” in a way that is similar to the World Bank’s sway over
nation-states, displacing existent institutional power structures and centralizing authority
while promoting competitive and entrepreneurial forms of development.174 The index
reimagines federalism under the sign of Digital India: a nation-state composed of discrete
territories in perpetual competition with each other under the watchful gaze of the central
government.

171

Merry, Davis, and Kingsbury, The Quiet Power of Indicators.
Bhuta, Malito, and Umbach, “Introduction,” 6.
173
I draw on a rich literature on indices and indicators from the past decade, including: Bhuta, Malito, and
Umbach, The Palgrave Handbook of Indicators in Global Governance; Kelley and Simmons, “The Power
of Performance Indicators”; Merry, “Measuring the World”; Cooley and Snyder, Ranking the World.
174
The index also appears to be waterfalling, being taken up at ever smaller scales, with states creating
rankings of districts and districts creating rankings of tehsils. See for example Goyal, “How PerformanceBased Rankings Are Shaking up the Rigid World of Government.”
172

Samdub 76
These exercises in enumeration are largely orchestrated by the National Institution
for Transforming India (better known by the awkward multilingual acronym NITI Aayog,
meaning “policy commission”), the government body that replaced the Planning
Commission shortly after the BJP’s 2014 election victory.175 Officially a think tank, the
Aayog is headed by a CEO, currently bulldoggish career bureaucrat Amitabh Kant who is
best known for having led branding initiatives like “Incredible India!”176 One of the NITI
Aayog’s key tools for influencing policy, indices arbitrarily rank administrative units and
place them in a competitive relationship with each other. The policies that will allow
states and districts to improve their ranking on these indices tend to be deregulatory,
promoting increased data capture and entrepreneurship in the work of development.
Though they promise minimum government and competitive federalism, NITI Aayog’s
indices empower the central government and weaken Indian federalism, realigning
channels of authority as part of the BJP’s broader moves to restructure power in India177.
A crucial part of the broader apparatus of governance that is in formation in India
today, indices are rewiring circuits of power between various actors within and beyond
the state – the think tank in Delhi, the World Bank, civil servants in the districts,
international consultancies, the entrepreneurial subject who is responsible for
development, and a new sort of public, imagined as a receiver of publicity.178 As a
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governance interface, the index is symptomatic of a program of radical reform garbed in
seemingly innocuous forms of management and visualization.

Framing competitive federalism
A map of India with state-level divisions occupies the centre of the CWMI’s online
interface. The map uses three colours – the red, yellow, and green that are a clearly
recognizable representation of performance – to render states’ composite scores on the
water management index. At a glance the viewer can make out three distinct groups of
states: those that are doing well, average and not so well.179 In a panel on the right, a table
ranks the states by score.180
[Figure 2]
Clicking on the map opens a new panel displaying detailed numbers for the state,
with a breakdown of how the scores are computed. In the CWMI, the twenty-eight
indicators that make up the index are categorized into nine sectors. Most indicators are
percentages out of hundred, for example “percentage of urban population being provided
drinking water supply as on the end of the given FY [Fiscal Year]” or “area under rainfed agriculture as a percentage of net cultivated area as on the end of the given FY.”
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Others are binary yes/no statements, where “yes” corresponds to a score of one hundred
and “no” corresponds to zero: “Has the state notified any law/legal framework to
facilitate Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) through Water User Associations
(WUA)?”, “Is electricity to tubewells/water pumps charged in the state?”181
Dashboards purport to be live, regularly updated representations of the current
moment. Though usually advertised as real-time, index dashboards are in fact updated at
the most every month (in the case of the Aspirational Districts dashboard) or in many
cases annually (as in the case of the CWMI). Yet this sense of liveness creates the
possibility of a state moving up or down in the rankings, change colour from red to
yellow to green. Even when such periodicity does not make sense – for many of the
indicators in the index are measures of structural or legal conditions that may take years
to change182 – the combination of ranking and liveness creates a sense of continual
competition.
This basic interface design, pitting administrative territorial units against each
other, appears in the NITI Aayog’s other index dashboards, including the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDG) index and the Aspirational Districts Programme (ADP)
Champions of Change Dashboard.183 Many of the Aayog’s indices don’t take the form of
the dashboard, yet a similar aesthetic logic is repeated even when they are presented in
reports and PowerPoint presentations. Sometimes there are variations: the Aspirational
Districts Programme takes districts as its unit and the Sustainable Development Goals
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Urban index takes cities, but the administrative unit – rather than, say, watersheds or
linguistic communities – remains at the centre of the index. Repeated across various
domains, these indices form a distinctive enumerative and aesthetic strategy for rendering
development as a competitive terrain. Their proponents are quite transparent about this:
Amitabh Kant repeatedly refers to indices as exercises in “naming and shaming,” and has
suggested that in the future, central government funding will be tied to states’
performance on them.184
[Figure 3]

Ranking Governance
The rise of indices as a key tool of global governance dates to the rise of what legal
scholar Radha D’Souza has called post-Washington consensus “governance
fundamentalism” in the 1990s.185 Over one hundred and sixty “global performance
indicators” existed by 2014, with eight new rankings created every year since 1999.186
One of the best-known global indicators of this kind was the World Bank’s Ease of
Doing Business Index, which was discontinued in 2021 after a data-manipulation
scandal.187 The Ease of Doing Business index shares much of the tabular and
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cartographic logic of information presentation outlined above and was a means by which
the World Bank effected regulatory reform without having to provide loans or technical
assistance, its traditional ways of exerting power.188
While several nation-states have bought into the project of such global rankings,
few have pursued it with as much zeal as India under the BJP. Today various government
bodies track India’s performance on such rankings. When India’s rankings on such
indices drop, they make aggressive efforts to improve it.189 When the nation does well, its
performance is advertised at every opportunity, shared on social media and disseminated
in the press in order to dramatize a “brand new India,” where the nation is figured
primarily as an investment destination.190
[Figure 4]
The Modi government’s investment in such exercises enabled India to move from
142nd to 62nd place in the rankings between 2016 and 2020. Some of this change is a
result of changes in the World Bank’s methodology.191 Many of these gains have come
through gaming the system, targeting indicators that can most easily be improved but
result in little substantive change on the ground, like reducing the amount of time it takes
to acquire digital signatures.192 Yet even if the ascent in the rankings is largely unrelated
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to concrete changes, the regulatory and legal shifts made in the name of “Ease of Doing
Business” have come at a cost. Trade unions have consistently opposed the labor reforms
for curtailing workers’ rights and benefitting the market.193 Environmental activists point
out that many of the reforms that have led to India’s improved rank have diluted
Environmental Impact Assessment regulations and had an adverse effect on the
environment.194 Above all, with flagging economic growth even before the Covid-19
pandemic, India’s improvement in Ease of Doing Business rankings has failed to deliver
the benefits it promised.
In 2014, shortly after BJP’s election to power in the central government, the
World Bank was invited to produce an assessment of Indian states’ regulatory norms.195
The resulting report evaluated all of India’s states on 98 different indicators in eight
areas, ranging from “Setting up a Business” to “Enforcing Contracts.” The introduction to
the assessment had already adopted the BJP’s new language of federalism, stating that the
World Bank Group was “pleased to support the Government of India in undertaking this
unique endeavor, because it takes a ‘competitive federalism’ approach to business
reform.”196 Now released every year, states hire international consultancies like EY and
PricewaterhouseCoopers to work on improving their rank.197 Its supporters among
neoliberal thinktanks have celebrated this exercise in no uncertain terms. A senior advisor
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at the Washington, DC-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies writes, “an
‘apples to apples’ review of the business environment of the states in 2016 gives savvy
chief ministers an unprecedented level of information on how they stack up versus their
competitors. The horses have definitely been taken to the water. And at least a few are
starting to drink”.198
Celebrated as devolution in economic policy, “cooperative and competitive
federalism” is altering the disposition of the relationship between the central government
and the states. In the planning era before the economic liberalization of 1991, the central
government tended to directly set policy goals for the states. Between 1991 and 2014, a
period characterized by coalition governments at the centre and the strengthening of
regional parties in the states, a “federal market economy” emerged, with states competing
against each other for global investment and the centre playing a relatively light-handed
role.199 In contrast, today a single-party central government uses supposedly neutral
indices to rank states on certain parameters, pushing certain policy and legislative
outcomes.200 Rather than telling states exactly what to do, NITI Aayog turns policy into a
game where states can ostensibly do as they please, but the score is still kept according to
its parameters.201 And while they may not be binding, the rules of the game – the
weightage of indicators on the index – effectively legislate the kinds of interventions that
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are necessary to improve one’s ranking.202 Far from increasing federalism, the project’s
aspirations tend towards despotism. Amitabh Kant recently shot to the spotlight for
saying that India is “too much of a democracy” to implement the tough reforms that
would make India more competitive,

Displacing Statistics
The index’s facilitation of competition can be understood through the forms of
enumeration it seeks to displace. Even though India has a well-developed and deeply
entrenched statistical apparatus, data for many indices are collected from scratch by
states. For example, against the established expertise of the statisticians who already
collect detailed data on many of the index’s parameters, state bureaucracies collected and
self-reported data that formed the basis of each of the indicators in the CWMI. This data
was then validated by an international development consultancy, IPE Global.203 The
sidelining of decades of statistical expertise has practical consequences for the scores
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generated by the index. In the case of the ADP, for example, agricultural economists T
Haque and PK Joshi have argued that the omission of conventional statistical measures
ended up excluding many of the poorest districts in the country, which are arguably in
greatest need of government intervention.204
The displacement of statistics is part of a larger conflict between the Modi
government and the postcolonial state’s statistical apparatus, and between ways of
knowing and acting upon the world, which policy scholar Yamini Aiyar characterises as a
shift from statistical data to administrative data.205 After Modi’s 2014 election, the
economic statistics produced by the Central Statistical Office, an expert body closely
linked to the Planning Commission that has collected economic statistics since the 1950s,
have been suppressed to a great degree.206 Notably, much of its survey data – when it was
eventually released – cast the BJP’s performance in a negative light, for example showing
dramatic decreases in employment and increases in poverty.207 By 2019, against
established procedure, NITI Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant was asserting the Cabinet’s right
to sign off on the CSO’s data.208 As economist Jayati Ghosh puts it “the aggressive
attitude towards economic statistics – and indeed to all data that could provide some

Haque and Joshi, “Agricultural Transformation in Aspirational Districts of India Comparative Analysis
of Districts in Bihar.”
205
Aiyar, “India’s Data-Driven Governance Regime Is Not Foolproof.” This in turn is part of a broader
“deinstitutionalization” of Indian democracy under Modi Jaffrelot, Modi’s India.. Sandeep Mertia suggests
a somewhat parallel conflict between “big data” and postcolonial statistics in Mertia, Lives of Data: Essays
on Computational Cultures from India.. This might be understood as an example of what Bruno Latour
calls an “agonistic” conflict between “immutable mobiles” Latour, “Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing
Things Together.”
206
For a historical approach to surveys as a form of knowledge production in postcolonial India, see Ghosh,
“Accepting Difference, Seeking Common Ground.”
207
Ghosh, “Hindutva, Economic Neoliberalism and the Abuse of Economic Statistics in India.”
208
Gupta, “Experts Rubbish Niti Claim That NSSO Data Needs Centre’s Nod.”
204

Samdub 85
semblance of accountability for the government – has become one of the defining
features of the government”209.
In place of data produced through sample surveys by a nominally independent,
expert government body, NITI Aayog’s indices use data largely collected by state
bureaucrats and “validated” by international consultancies, creating a “closed loop of
compatible information” that is insulated from external critique.210 It’s not that survey
data is unimpeachable or cannot be manipulated. The Planning Commission indulged in
its fair share of manipulation by, for example, vastly downplaying the magnitude of
India’s poverty and hunger in its poverty estimates211. But while state statistics are
regularly wielded against the state – this is how economist Utsa Patnaik used the
Planning Commission’s own data to diagnose its “statistical trickery”, for example – the
closed loop of the index and its manipulations are more resistant to exposure.212 By
concealing its data sources – and moving away from publicly accessible, independently
collected statistics – the index, to borrow a phrase from media studies scholar Shannon
Mattern, translates “perception into performance, epistemology into ontology”213.
Crucially, these different calculative regimes afford different ways of governing.
The periodicity and scale of the CSO’s sample surveys produce data about industrial
production or numbers unemployed people or statistics on consumer spending, a “realist”
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metrological account that purports to represent the world.214 By contrast, though they also
conceal their epistemology and claim realism, the NITI Aayog’s indices produce
percentages and ranked lists, “meta-measurements” that favor synchronic comparisons
between territories and render development as an ongoing competition between states215.

“Composite water”: the index as a source of authority
“Composite water”, “agriculture transformation”, “India innovation”, “aspirational
districts”: the measurements produced by these indices don’t refer to concrete objects or
quantities in the world. Though they proclaim their matter-of-factness, these are in fact
arbitrary categories. As Sally Engle Merry puts it: “One of the critical ways an indicator
produces knowledge is by announcing what it measures.”216
The dramatic opening lines of 2018 NITI Aayog report that introduced the CWMI are
instructive in how the index produces a new category:
“India is suffering from the worst water crisis in its history and millions of lives
and livelihoods are under threat. Currently, 600 million Indians face high to
extreme water stress and about two lakh [200,000] people die every year due to
inadequate access to safe water. By 2030, the country’s water demand is projected
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to be twice the available supply, implying severe water scarcity for hundreds of
millions of people and an eventual ~6% loss in the country’s GDP”217
The language of crisis is not new when talking about water in India.218 Yet the report
smoothly combines two crises that are usually treated separately, jumping from concerns
of drinking water safety to diminishing water supply, which is a problem of groundwater
overextraction that primarily affects irrigation. The groundwater crisis and the safe
drinking water crisis align with two different uses of water with different histories. For
better or for worse, in 2018 they were the responsibility of separate ministries: the
Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation. The
amalgamation of the two into a single “composite water” presaged a 2019 reshuffle in
which the two ministries were combined to form a single ministry of Jal Shakti (or “water
power”) that oversees both drinking and agricultural water.219
Most indices promise holistic, composite, or “multidimensional” measures.
Despite the composite category announced by its title, the CWMI doesn’t treat the
complex problems of water management in a holistic manner. The CWMI’s indicators
remain separated by category such that there is no overlap between “groundwater” and
“health and sanitation.” And the single, “information-poor” number into which they are
combined gives little insight into water management practices in India.220 A critique of
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the CWMI that attempts to formulate a more holistic index points out that only 5% of the
index is devoted to water quality, while geotagging water-management structures and
creating a “water data center” account for more than seven percent. Effectively,
implementing a system for data collection counts more towards a state’s score than taking
steps to prevent deaths due to water-borne diseases. Furthermore, states are
disproportionately rewarded for making legislative and regulatory changes while the
actual outcomes of better water management – like reduced levels of water-borne
diseases – are not measured.221
If the creation of composite water is unlikely to generate more holistic policy or
better outcomes for the millions of Indians with impaired access to water, its constitution
might be understood more fruitfully as a manoeuvre that enables the NITI Aayog, a new
agency within the state, to accrue power relative to already existing actors. A highly
publicized project reported on by various newspapers, the CWMI reorients the
relationships between the existing stakeholders in these fields. By constituting composite
water as a new – and apparently technical – policy category under which both drinking
water and groundwater are subsumed, the index announces NITI Aayog’s authority over
both. The value of composite water then is precisely in its arbitrariness and its appearance
of technicality. By creating new standards on which states are ranked, NITI Aayog
renders the problem of distribution, a political issue which involves power struggles at
every level, as a technical question of resource allocation.222
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The NITI Aayog’s indices are devices for apportioning responsibility. Since 2014,
newspapers have been full of headlines about states’ performance on NITI Aayog’s
indices. Often these headlines simply repeat government press releases about states’
performance on the index. But in doing so they also exert pressure on bureaucrats and
politicians, pushing them to take up these indices and their reconstituted categories as
ways of orienting and measuring their performance. “Assam faces criticism for ranking
last in NITI Aayog’s SDG; CM [Chief Minister] Sarma hits back” reads one headline.223.
“Working to top Niti Aayog’s devpt goals index: Goa CM Pramod Sawant” says
another224. Such headlines show that far from disavowing its ownership of its indices, the
NITI Aayog – and the central government – is a highly visible actor in the drama of
development.
In contrast to the Planning Commission, which it replaced, NITI Aayog has no
powers to allocate funding. Rather than producing five-year plans with targets tied to
funding, it produces broad recommendations.225 Borrowing from the World Bank’s Ease
of Doing Business playbook, in the absence of financial or legal backing to enforce its
recommendations, the ranking of various states on indices becomes a key tool for the
Aayog to give heft to its desired ends.

Big Data and the Dashboard
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The CWMI is the basis for a yearly report which makes explicit the policy outcomes the
index facilitates.226 It argues for the promotion of “market-based interventions,”
“participatory irrigation frameworks,” and “the consolidation of state data centres into a
central data platform with open APIs [to] allow entrepreneurs and researchers to lead
innovation in the sector”227. The state’s role is to deregulate and make space for private
actors – whether they are the NGOs of participatory approaches or the private
entrepreneurs of market-based interventions – or to use its coercive apparatus to set up
infrastructures for the collection and visualization of data.
This can be linked to a politics of austerity within which the index functions.228
Like other NITI Aayog projects, the CWMI doesn’t grant any funding. The report
qualifies the establishment of a new National Irrigation Fund by stating that “the cost of
setting this up is expected to be low as existing funds can be consolidated into this
structure”.229 In the world of NITI Aayog, “existing funds” are always adequate, they are
just being used poorly by a state mired in inefficiencies. The report pushes states to
innovate in order to generate funding for themselves or to exploit “convergences” in
existing funding.230 As an Aayog report on the ADP puts it: “Surprising as it may sound,
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if the assistance … from different sources is aggregated, and the principle of convergence
is applied to a particular activity, there is no paucity of funds”.231
Collecting and visualizing large amounts of data is one of the CWMI’s most
insistent recommendations. One of the best practice case studies presented in the report is
of the Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Information and Management System
(APWRIMS) This dashboard provides real-time data on rainfall, reservoir capacity,
groundwater levels, soil moisture and more. The data sources combine numbers input by
bureaucrats with satellite sources as well as data computed by algorithms. Built by the
start-up Vassar Labs, the stated aim of the APWRIMS is to enable data-backed decisionmaking.232
[Figure 5]
Alongside indices, such data portals, or dashboards, are ubiquitous in India today.
Unlike the aggregate numbers produced by indices, these data portals purport to track
every instance of a given object: bodies (through the biometric identity database
Aadhaar), vaccinated cows, cubic meters of water, streetlights, all are being accounted for
on various data portals, often in close to real-time. Despite differences in the form and
use of enumeration, data portals go hand in hand with the index and its drive for
privatization and entrepreneurship. As the CWMI report puts it,
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“water data systems…can enable targeted policymaking by states in areas such as
agricultural incentives, groundwater recharge, etc., and can also enable innovative
market interventions such as a groundwater impact bond and water markets…
since the data will be available on a public platform, researchers, entrepreneurs,
NGOs, and policymakers can use it to create innovative products, provide valueadded services, and design targeted policies and interventions.”233
While “management information systems” have been in use in Indian government since
the 1980s efforts of the National Informatics Commission and the Ministry of Programme
Implementation, the idea that these should be publicly accessible in the form of a
dashboard is a more recent development.234 In India, the use of the publicly accessible
portal or dashboard in governance at the central level might be traced to the BJP’s
adoption of Aadhaar in 2014. Although the BJP had campaigned against this project,
upon winning the election the government began promoting Aadhaar even more
aggressively than before. Just months after the election, Modi ordered that all central
government employees be registered in the Aadhaar database. The fact of their existence
on this database enabled an attendance dashboard that promised to track publicly and in
real-time whether state employees were at work.235 Like the index, though at a different
scale, the data portal promises to make the state transparent and efficient through the
“real-time” visualization of information.
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Aadhaar has since become the basis for an ecosystem, described in chapter 1,
where access to the biometric database of over a billion Indians is made available to
private-sector organizations through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
collectively known as India Stack, covered in the previous chapter. The CWMI report
holds India Stack up as a “best practice” model for how water data should be treated.236
As with the index, the appeal to managerial efficiency covers for increased privatization
of vital state functions and a discourse of a transformed India as a “start-up state”.237
Geographer Kavita Dattani terms this “governtrepreneurism,” arguing that “Aadhaar and
the India Stack, as new digital technologies of governmentality, reduce interactions
between state and populations into digital transactions, enabling the weaving of corporate
into government”.238

Entrepreneurial State Apparatus
The NITI Aayog’s indices modify one of the central categories of the postcolonial state,
development. According to architecture theorist Reinhold Martin, one of the defining
features of infrastructures is that they enable the cultural production of distinctions,
creating and sustaining the categories that order the world.239 Under the reign of the
index, development is constituted by participatory market approaches and systematic data
collection. When states rank high on the index, they are celebrated; when they rank low,
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the index’s recommendations prescribe the ways in which they can improve their
performance, shaping what counts as development and how it should be achieved.
This version of development is opposed to older versions: the planned
development identified with Nehru as well as the post-1991 Congress party’s “inclusive
neoliberalism”.240 In contrast to the perceived failures of planned, top-down, bureaucratic
and corrupt Congress-led development (the consistent bête noire of the BJP), the index
promises development that is transparent, efficient, and entrepreneurial. In previous
periods, the numbers undergirding development were a matter for experts, debated by
economists, planners and high-level bureaucrats. Today, the dramatization of the index
suggests new protagonists in the “imagined economy”.241
Communications scholar Lilly Irani argues that private profit and development are
reconciled in the figure of an entrepreneurial citizen who is central to the new imaginary
of the nation-state. Irani’s entrepreneurial citizen is a middle-class, upper-caste urbanite
who navigates a global network stretching from development consultancies to World
Bank reports to Silicon Valley, continually innovating products and services that can both
uplift and extract capital from the masses.242 The entrepreneur is a less elite actor in
political scientist Priya Chacko’s account, a culturally-Hindu “virtuous market citizen” of
the new consumer classes inaugurated by India’s economic success in the 1990s and
2000s.243
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In the story of the index, bureaucrat-as-CEO Amitabh Kant may be the most
entrepreneurial figure of them all, suggesting the centrality of the state in
entrepreneurship in India. As historian Ravinder Kaur notes “the honorific CEO is now a
form of recognition, even fulsome praise, of those who bring corporate style—as men of
action— to the work of state administration”.244 Yet for all the public appeal to
entrepreneurship, the Indian economy since 2014 has become less open for new business
opportunities, more financialized and fallen more into the grip of large conglomerates,
which are “aligning their business strategies with the avowed policy goals of the Modi
government”.245
It may be most fruitful to consider the entrepreneur, like the index, like
“maximum governance,” as a purposely vague signifier. Art historian Pamela Lee
describes the think tank, another player in this drama, as “an allover, ambient state – a
sensibility – writ large, at planetary scale… an aesthetic.”246 The index and its vision of
entrepreneurial development go hand in hand with other glossy images of a transforming
India: holograms of Narendra Modi, gigantic statues of Indian political figures and the
glass architecture of “world-class” urban developments.247 But it is also unlike these
glossy images, for it is a technical abstraction, an apparently weightless and placeless
node in a global techno-managerial culture. Though the index is a fairly low-tech number
– simply composed of weighted averages – it is consistently performed as part of a hightech Digital India. The global placelessness of technical standards undergirds the index’s
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aesthetic appeal and attests to a transforming India. Looking at slum clearances in New
Delhi, urban geographer D Asher argues that the state’s enumerative apparatus has been
replaced by a focus on aesthetic markers of what appears to be “world-class”. In the
index, the state’s calculative apparatus itself is rendered aesthetic, statistics is reborn as
branding.248
Far from being sidelined by entrepreneurship, a new, more assertive, central
government (which we encounter in other domains as increasingly violent) attempts to
shape the conditions in which markets come to exist in the first place. Deviating from the
conventional story of neoliberalism, entrepreneurship becomes a site for centralizing state
power. The unruly territories of Indian federalism – racially, linguistically and culturally
diverse, ruled by parties from across the political spectrum – are disciplined by the
central government through numbers rendered as images. As an infrastructure that is
simultaneously technical, aesthetic and media-political, the index reshapes the relation
between politics, administration, publics and territory.
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"India is the world's largest and oldest [sic!] democracy. Even as we speak, there is a
yagya [a sacrificial act] that is underway to construct the temple of democracy… On
India Today we have both the swapna drishta [dream visionary] or the one whose seen
that big dream... and we also have the swapna shrishta [dream creator] somebody who
turns that dream into reality"249
-

India Today conclave

“A new Master Plan is to be drawn up for the entire Central Vista area that represents the
values and aspirations of a New India – Good Governance, Efficiency, Transparency,
Accountability and Equity and is rooted in the Indian Culture and social milieu”
-

Notice Inviting Bids from National/International Design & Planning Firms for
Consultancy Services for comprehensive Architectural & Engineering
planning for the “Development/Redevelopment of Parliament Building,
Common Central Secretariat and Central Vista at New Delhi”

Hours after he got off the plane from a five-day trip to the USA in September 2021, a
hard-hatted Narendra Modi visited the site of the Central Vista Redevelopment, the vast
project of demolition and construction currently underway in the heart of New Delhi. In
the US, Modi had met Biden and other top officials, addressed the UN General
Assembly, and conducted a meeting with the leaders of “the Quad”, the new geopolitical
alliance between India, the US, Japan and Australia. His late-night visit to the
construction site was reported as “unannounced” and the Prime Minister was supposedly
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unaccompanied by his security detail.250 The widely circulated photographs of the visit
dramatized the Prime Minister as a tireless, hyper efficient and accountable figure,
performing as the architect of maximum governance.
[Figure 6]
Meanwhile, at the India Today Conclave (“#ABetterNormal”), a yearly “thought
platform” organized by one of the biggest media houses in the country, the project’s
architect Bimal Patel, who has been called “Modi’s favourite architect”, is in
conversation with the Minister for Housing and Urban Affairs Hardeep Singh Puri,
whose agency is overseeing the project. The event is introduced in a hyperbolic language
that combines the self-congratulatory post-colonial trope of India as the “world’s largest
democracy” with the epic Sanskrit of Hindu mythology. The suffusion of state and
society with language and iconography from a mythic Hindu past has been a strong
tendency under the Hindu right, often fueling communal violence and signaling a move
away from post-colonial India’s official, though ever shaky, commitments to secular
democracy.251 But despite the use of this language in its framing here, the architecture of
the Central Vista – and the technocratic domains of efficiency and transparency that it
appears to inhabit – tend to disavow explicit links to Hindutva ideology.
Official media representations of the project, driven by aggressive state PR, have
instead focused on the way in which the project signals the state’s willingness to
undertake large infrastructure projects, to make highly visible changes at a new scale and

Methri, “PM Modi Pays Unannounced Visit to Central Vista Project Site; Takes Stock of Work
Underway.”
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in the name of the people.252 While even the project’s staunchest critics tend to concede
that the existing infrastructure is technically inadequate,253 like all infrastructural projects
the Central Vista redevelopment is not only technical – addressing a practical need for
new infrastructure – but also aesthetic – symbolizing a New India of maximum
governance.254 In contrast to the old India, represented by the corrupt and inefficient
opposition Congress party, the present government’s approach is efficient and
technocratic, getting done what needs to be done.255 According to Patel, who has a PhD
from UC Berkeley’s prestigious urban planning department, his plans will “strengthen the
Central Vista as an icon for governance, a grand public space and a treasured part of
India’s heritage.”256
This is visible in Patel’s design choices. Rather than mobilizing Hindu symbolism,
the buildings’ facades attempt to blend in with the existing hybrid British architecture of
imperial Delhi. And instead of using Hindu spatial configurations, Patel describes at
length the way he is modelling the buildings on airports in Singapore and elsewhere, to
maximize security and efficient circulation. To the occasional dismay of the more
literally minded elements on the Hindu right, rather than functioning as a straightforward
symbol of Hindu nationalist politics, the Central Vista’s design operates in a managerial

Mohan, Padmanabhan, and Kennedy, “The Shades of Populism in Narendra Modi’s Politics of
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register that disavows its link to Hindutva.257 One of the most persistent – and important
– strains of criticism against the project dismisses the appearance of technocratic
efficiency as a “mask”, and argues that the Central Vista is in fact a monument to
Narendra Modi and Hindu nationalism.258
But this argument only works up to a point, for aspirations towards managerial
governance are as real as the violence of Hindu nationalism, and both must be reckoned
with together. In the aesthetics of governance that is compressed in the Central Vista
project, maximum governance is certainly a mask for the increasing communal violence
that has characterized the years since 2014. Additionally, however, it is an agenda for a
neoliberal model of development and an aspirational populist register for a middle-class
mass politics. It draws together the central public space of the capital, the optimization of
the bureaucracy, a new relation between the state and citizens, and the Hindu nationalism
of the BJP.
[Figure 7]

The Project
“The Objectives of Central Vista Development/Redevelopment Master Plan include
upgrading Parliament's space and facilities, consolidating, rationalizing and synergizing
Pawariya, “Central Vista.”
Dev, “Modi’s Folly”; See also Krishna Menon, “Behind Modi’s Plans to Redevelop the Central Vista Is
a Covert Political Agenda.” Other critics of the project have attacked it from many fronts: on account of the
number of trees that will be uprooted, for not following zoning regulations, because of the fact that the
construction was designated “essential” and continued at full pace during the height of the second wave of
the Covid-19 pandemic. For a summary of these criticisms see Oommen and Narayanan, “Democracy,
Development and Identity.”
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government functioning, refurbishing and better equipping the Central Vista Avenue,
strengthening cultural institutions in the Central Vista, providing adequate facilities for
the Vice President and the Prime Minister, commemorating 75 years of India's
independence and above all showcasing strength and resolve of New India after
Independence to execute an historic national project in 6 years. In this endeavor, the
Guiding Principles of the Centra Vista Plan [sic] include conservation of Heritage,
expanding public space, ensuring Transit Oriented Development, construction of
accessible, energy efficient and green buildings with state-of-art construction technology
and efficient management practices, thereby create inspiring work spaces with modern
technology & facilities.”259
-

Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, in response to a critical article on
independent news website Newslaundry

When it is complete, the Central Vista redevelopment will reorder the administrative and
legislative heart of the Indian nation-state. The project involves demolitions and new
constructions along the Central Vista, a two-kilometre-long ceremonial axis connecting
Rashtrapati Bhavan, the President’s Palace, and the triumphal arch of India Gate, a space
built at the height of the British Raj as the seat of empire and later appropriated by the
postcolonial nation-state.260 As part of the $2 billion project, new offices will be built for
over 50,000 government workers, at least two new museums will be built in the North

Team NL, “Government Responds to Newslaundry Article on Central Vista.” My italics.
The Central Vista is the name given to this axis by its architect, Edwin Lutyens. Once built, it was
referred to as Kingsway. In 1955 it was renamed Rajpath, meaning Royal Way, which the modernist
architect Habib Rahman pointed out was out of place in a democracy. For this history see Gupta, “From
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and South blocks that currently serve as government offices, a new triangular Parliament
building will replace the old circular one, the National Museum and the National
Archives, with all their objects and collections, will be shifted into new premises, and the
Prime Minister and the Vice President will both receive new homes.
The speed at which the project is unfolding is invoked as a sign of the New India. A
limited design competition was announced by the government in September 2019. Just a
month later, after a process that was widely criticized by the architecture community for
its lack of transparency, the Gujarat-based architecture and planning firm HCP was
announced as the winning bidder.261 Construction began in January 2021, before much of
the design was complete, continuing at breakneck pace even during the height of the
second wave of the Covid pandemic in India. The landscaping of the central avenue was
complete for the annual Republic Day parade in January 2022, while the new Parliament
will be ready for the 2022 winter parliament session in November 2022. Construction on
the Common Central Secretariat is slated to begin in 2022 and end by 2024, in time for
the next general election. As befits an iconic project of the new India, the government
reassures us, the Central Vista will not be delayed.262

After Modernism

“Patel did not often speak about his architectural philosophy… Patel rarely, if ever,

A good summary of the main “technocratic and processual” critiques from the architecture community –
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discussed his aesthetic quest or his architectural style… Patel also never articulated his
social or political philosophy… Patel himself never explicitly articulated what his
architecture’s ethical stance was”263.
- Bimal Patel on his father Hasmukh Patel

Hasmukh Patel was part of the first generation of postcolonial Indian architects, who
were trained in the West and returned to India to build the postcolonial nation-state in the
1950s. While many of his colleagues threw themselves into the project of
developmentalist nation-building in service of Nehruvian socialism, Patel’s focus with
HCP, the firm he founded and that his son Bimal inherited, was more regional and more
focused on private sector and corporate clients. When real estate development replaced
the state in the 1980s as the motive force behind organized construction, Bimal writes,
“unlike many architects who high-mindedly refused to engage with this new mode of
building production, Patel enthusiastically tackled many real estate projects”264.
The writing about his father reflects something of Patel Jr’s own approach, steering
clear of “high-mindedness” and strong ideological positions. Like many practitionerintellectuals of the free market who peddle hard-nosed pragmatism, Patel portrays
himself as a recovered Marxist. Though he toyed with Marxist approaches at Berkeley,265
as a practicing architect and planner he realized that “Marxism offers the most
penetrating and insightful diagnoses of the ills of capitalist societies. However, the
solutions it provides are not only not workable, they are positively harmful.”266 In
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contrast to his PhD work, much of Patel’s recent academic writing offers rationalized,
market-based, and deregulatory solutions to a range of urban issues. In articles like
“Building Regulations are a barrier to affordable housing in Indian cities”, “Working
with the market: new approaches to reducing slums in India” and “Emergence of suboptimal land utilization patterns in Indian cities”, he holds up the efficient and rational
working of the market as the solution to the manifold problems that beset urban
settlements in India. His co-authors are the quintessential agents of neoliberal
globalization, researchers at the World Bank or big US think tanks like the Hoover
Institute or the Brookings Institution.267
The turn to the market that took place through the 1980s in India was accompanied
by a parallel but distinct a shift in the formal vocabulary of architecture. Emerging from
the strict directives of modernism, starting in the 1970s architects had begun to rediscover
indigenous motifs, materials and spatial configurations.268 Ahmedabad, home to Gandhi’s
Sabarmati Ashram and a key site for the emergence of an indigenous modernity, was a
centre of this movement. By the 1970s, architects like Charles Correa and BV Doshi were
breaking with their modernist training under Louis Kahn and Le Corbusier, the major
Western modern architects who left a lasting influence on the architecture of the city and
the nation. Both Doshi and Correa turned to Hindu cosmology and spirituality as a
guiding motif in their practices, part of a global pushback against European modernism’s
universal pretensions that architecture critic Kenneth Frampton called “critical
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regionalism” and which historians of Indian architecture have called “the search for
identity”269. Notably, Doshi founded a university, the Centre for Environmental Planning
and Technology (now simply known as CEPT) in 1962 to promote his distinctive
approach to architecture. In the 1970s and 80s, Hasmukh Patel was one of the main
administrators at CEPT and today the institution is run by Bimal Patel.270
A belated move away from modernist orthodoxies can be tracked in Bimal Patel’s
architectural output. His early work in the 1990s, full of raw concrete facades interrupted
by geometric shapes, openly bears the influences of Kahn and Corbusier. Though he
retains a fondness for boxy massing, exposed brick and concrete and geometric shapes,
his more recent work takes a chameleonic approach to design. An observatory at a
“multi-developer, multi-facility and multi-beneficiary solar park” wraps an exposed steel
structure around a central column. In the Surat Municipal Corporation Science Centre,
the messy collision of the building’s three different programmes is ostentatiously
dramatized: one section with large glass panels and rounded concrete houses an
auditorium, another with a windowless black stone façade makes up galleries, a café and
a shop, and a glass-and-concrete cube encases a spherical steel planetarium. A shiny steel
art object that vaguely resembles a ship clings to the front of the Chennai Container
Terminal’s concrete facade.
[Figures 8-9]
Patel’s idiosyncratic output reflects a varied client list, speaking to his unique
positionality between politics and industry in India today. His unbuilt projects, in
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particular, expose faultlines in new India’s much-vaunted and speculative
entrepreneurialism. The Jio Institute, a new university founded by India’s richest man
Mukesh Ambani, which was embroiled in controversy before it opened, remains unbuilt.
The Panchamrut Bhavan, a 23,000 square-metre museum complex designed to express
the panchamrut (or “five ambrosia”) approach to governance that Narendra Modi
propounded during his time as Gujarat’s Chief Minister, was put on hold after repeated
environmental protests.271
Patel’s practice is representative of a moment of massive transformation in India,
emerging from broader shifts that have been afoot across India since the 1980s. Both
stylistically and in its orientation to state and market, Patel’s architecture is part of a wave
of reactions to the decades of Nehruvian socialism. He is, then, a skillful player of the
strong neoliberal and sectarian order that has emerged after the free market reforms of
1991, which brought an end to the planned economy, and the destruction of the Babri
Masjid in 1992, which heralded the emergence at the national level of a cultural and
religious nationalism rooted in upper-caste Hinduism.272

Neoliberal High Modernism
Even if Patel’s work in many ways represents a break with modernism, it inherits what
political theorist James C Scott has analyzed as “Le Corbusier’s love (mania?) for simple,

Referencing the ritual mixing of five natural foods – milk, ghee, curd, honey and jaggery – panchamrut
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repetitive lines, and his horror of complexity”.273 Proposals for converting Ahmedabad’s
Sabarmati riverfront from a shifting monsoonal water body with a floodplain occupied by
squatter settlements into a perennial river with promenades on fixed banks have been
tabled since the 1960s.274 But it was only in 1998 that Environmental Planning
Collaborative, a not-for-profit consultancy headed by Patel, put forward a practicable
plan.
[Figures 10-11]
On the riverfront, Patel not only provided a master plan for a “world-class” leisure
space, but produced a comprehensive formula that addressed many different aspects of
urban development to make the project possible. As Ahmedabad-based public policy
scholar Navdeep Mathur put it, “from aligning abstract neo-liberal elements with the
needs of the different populations in the city - open spaces for the middle classes, better
housing for the poor, flood management, better transportation for all, etc, his proposal
crafted entirely new modernist imaginaries into the realm of possibility”.275 The
riverfront was redefined as an ecologically vulnerable space that was being destroyed by
the poor people who were squatting on its banks. In a departure from the rigid approach
of classic high modernists, the project was pitched not only as an opportunity to clean up
the river, but also to resettle the poor in formal housing where they would be given land
title, a skillful appeal to a range of stakeholders. Furthermore, the project served a
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symbolic function: Gujarat under Chief Minister Narendra Modi was in search of an
iconic project that would stand for its development successes.
Such methods harnessed and produced new ideas of the public.276 On the banks of
the Sabarmati, according to Patel, the poor had privatized public land. In a moment of
unusual candidness, Patel has referred to the traders of a 600-year old informal market
with over 100,000 weekly visitors as “crooks who don’t pay taxes”.277 The project cost of
$300 million was financed by selling 21% of the reclaimed land to private developers.
Watersports facilities, luxury housing and floating restaurants would take the place of the
squatter settlements on the riverfront. Meanwhile, 14,000 households were evicted
officially, and many more unofficially, and resettled to distant areas with no running
water where they had to build their own shanties. Many of these people lost their jobs,
children dropped out of schools and suffered adverse health effects. Patel’s professed
goal was to “return the river to the public”.278
Under the combined gaze of Modi and Patel, the riverfront was characterized by
the inscrutable congestion and chaos of the informal and must be removed.279 As James
Scott reminds us, high modernism is an aesthetic project, where for the architect Le
Corbusier the appearance of “formal order was the precondition of efficiency”, even if
one did not in practice follow from the other.280 Urban geographer D Asher Ghertner
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refers to this dynamic as one of “aesthetic governmentality”.281 According to Ghertner,
under constraints of urgency and in the face of an increasingly complex system of
statistics and maps, aesthetics came to replace enumeration as the principle that
determined people’s legitimate habitation in a locality. How well an area matched up to
the image of the world class determined its fate.
A formula combining privatisation, images of a "world-class" leisure space, and
income-generation for the municipality, the riverfront redevelopment generated a public
of middle-class consumers of world-class leisure facilities. Its fallout was the violent
exclusion and displacement of the poor. The project combined aspirations for middleclass leisure with the project of slum clearances and the creation of a hard-banked,
largely privatized river. This combination of a high-modernist gaze with a distinctly
neoliberal flexibility is characteristic of Patel’s work.

Efficiency
“Improving productivity and efficiency by building a new secretariat is the key objective
of this project… it's not to build buildings but that's the larger level objective… this is not
the glamourous part of architecture, but it’s serious business”282

- Bimal Patel
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[Figure 11]
One of the central components of the Central Vista project is the construction of a
Common Central Secretariat, ten new government buildings that will line the leafy
central avenue that stretches from Rashtrapati Bhavan to India Gate. The ministries and
departments that will be shifted to these buildings are mostly housed in the North and
South Blocks, the two buildings designed by Edwin Lutyens which flank Rashtrapati
Bhavan and in various buildings from the 1950s and 60s that occupy the site of the new
secretariat, as well as in other offices around New Delhi. The consolidation of all these
ministries and departments into purpose-built structures is central to the project’s promise
of efficiency and productivity. The estimate of how many employees will work here
ranges from 50,000 to 70,000 and each of the buildings will have a floor area of over
400,000 square metres.283 The move from the “present scatter of inadequate offices” to
the new buildings is visualized simplistically in Patel’s slides as increasing both
efficiency and productivity in a linear fashion.
Patel’s Central Vista buildings combine an architecture of management and
circulation with a conservative façade borrowed from the Raj-era buildings of central
Delhi to mask the ideology of the ruling party. In Enduring Innocence, Keller Easterling
describes the buildings that litter the office parks of Bangalore in the 1990s (including
those of the Infosys campus, covered in chapter 1 of this thesis) as fantastical glass
edifices that perform a high-tech, sci-fi futurism.284 The buildings of the Central Vista,
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being offices of the central government, display more restraint. But even so, the contrast
from the futuristic placelessness of the Bangalore tech parks is instructive of the distance
that has been travelled since the 1990s. Unlike the Bangalore tech parks, which strived
towards an architecture shorn of visible markers of tradition, the Central Vista buildings
represent a reterritorialization, via colonial heritage, of the architecture of efficiency and
modernity in India. This can be seen in the evolution of the design of the Parliament
building. The first glimpse of the design showed the new Parliament topped with a shiny
gilded spire thrusting up into the sky. More recent designs have replaced the ostentatious
spire with a lion capital, the symbol of postcolonial India that Nehru appropriated from
the ancient Buddhist king Ashoka.285
[Figures 12 and 13]
Patel’s plans for the Common Central Secretariat combine the architecture of
airports, which are calibrated to maximize circulation and security, with the ideals of
productive office spaces, where design has the capacity to increase worker efficiency.
The Secretariat buildings will be connected by a dedicated underground people carrier,
which Patel models on the internal transit systems at the airports of Singapore and Dubai.
The circulation within the buildings will be “simple and straightforward”, unlike the
mazelike setup that characterizes existing government buildings.286 In a five minute
segment of a presentation where he describes the secretariat, Patel uses the word
“efficiency” or variants thereof no fewer than 20 times. Patel’s main reference, to which
he repeatedly returns in his presentations, is Francis Duffy’s The New Office, a book
published in 1997 that is a sort of how-to manual for managerially-oriented architects.
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Swinging from analyses of Edward Hopper paintings to innovations in cable
management, the case studies in Duffy’s book are glass office buildings belonging to
Japanese and American multinational firms. These offices eschew the “hierarchy of space
and furniture related to status” in favour of “multiple shared group work and individual
task-based settings… [that are] geared to work process and its tasks”. The design logic of
the new office is based on “dens”, “clubs”, “hives” and “cells” 287.
These spaces epitomise what sociologist Manuel Castells has described as a shift
“from vertical bureaucracy to horizontal organization”288. One of Patel’s teachers at
Berkeley, Castells theorized the network society as an ambivalent diagnosis of the state
of affairs under neoliberal globalization. Patel has taken up such descriptions as
prescriptions for how space should be organized. His practice uses architecture’s
modernist promise of reforming subjects through spatial reconfiguration to create a world
in the image of the corporation. Geographer Nigel Thrift argues that Duffy’s spaces are
symptomatic of neoliberal capitalism’s continued attempt to extract value by creating
“buildings which could encompass many modes of social interaction by encouraging both
concentration and dispersion simultaneously”.289 The goal is to produce innovation, now
a guiding principle not only for private entrepreneurs seeking to maximize profits but
also for government servants responsible for their agencies’ bottom lines.290
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Hindu Managerialism
With his grey hair, thick-rimmed glasses and black shirt, Bimal Patel plays the part of the
architect as global managerial professional, immersed in discourses of efficiency and
governance. Yet despite the appearance of placeless globalism and his disavowal of any
strong Hindu identity, Patel’s religious and caste ties deeply root him in the communal
politics that define contemporary India. Scholar of public policy Navdeep Mathur points
out that Patel’s position as a member of one of Gujarat’s dominant castes facilitated his
selection as the consultant on the Sabarmati project.291 And Patel is one among many
Gujaratis whose careers have followed Modi’s ascent from Ahmedabad to Delhi.
While many critics have made the connection between the BJP’s Hindu nationalist
politics and the Central Vista project, concrete architectural evidence of this connection is
hard to come by. Rather, because the architecture and the architect disavow the Hindutva
ideology of the ruling party, such arguments tend to be historical or circumstantial or
based on slips of the architect’s tongue. This has been lamented by the more literallyminded elements among the Hindu right, who argue that “a great opportunity to revive
Hindu architecture has been missed”.292
At one point in a presentation on the Central Vista Redevelopment, Patel discusses
the “forms and symbolism” that are to be used in the new parliament building. He is less
enthusiastic here than when talking about circulation and technology. He begins by
explaining the building’s triangular footprint. “I say the plot is triangular … this that, it
doesn’t help,” he says, performing the classic frustration that architect has with client.
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“Well, you know, it’s a sacred geometry, triangles and trinities”, he continues
exasperatedly. The slide behind him shows examples of such sacred geometries. Two of
the examples, of a Sri Yantra and rock carvings of Hindu gods, are clearly Hindu. A third
image, of a traditional jali, or latticed screen, is labelled simply “jali patterns”. Patel
points the pointer at it. "In case you're worried, that's Humayun's Tomb, so..." he says,
trailing off elliptically.293 The audience titters with laughter. Patel is referring to the 16thcentury tomb of the Mughal emperor Humayun, a member of a dynasty that is regularly
attacked by the Hindu right as “Muslim invaders”, and a major example of Islamic
architecture in India. The humour is in the distance between what is said and what
remains unspoken but is known to everyone in the room.
[Figure 14]
Between what’s said and unsaid Patel leaves room for a range of interpretations:
Clearly, the slideshow will travel and be seen by various parties within the Hindu
nationalist government who might not be amenable to the use of “Muslim” patterns in the
buildings of their new capital. Yet Patel is also pitching it to the audience of (presumably
liberal) architects and architecture students gathered for his talk as a sort of inside joke, to
assuage their “worries”. Under the YouTube video, Patel’s “in case you’re worried” is
read by one commenter as “shade thrown at pseudo seculars”.294 Meanwhile, the brief
and hurried way in which he treats forms and symbolism buries these aspects of the
buildings under a global discourse of efficiency and governance that pitches India as a
good investment destination and a paradigm of good governance. This heteroglossia —
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the ability to speak in a way that can simultaneously service a range of constituencies —
is one of the main strengths of Patel and other such experts who implement the
technocratic visions of the BJP.
A similar heteroglossia crops up in the Kashi Viswanathan project, another of the
vast government commissions that Patel is working on. The project creates a 50-foot
wide, 300-metre long pathway between the holy ghats on the Ganga in Banaras and the
Kashi Vishwanath temple in the city, easing access for the millions of devotees who visit
it each year. The construction of the corridor, currently underway, will expand the space
around Kashi Vishwanath temple from 3,000 square feet to 50,000 square feet and has
resulted in the demolition of more than 270 houses and 15 neighbourhoods. In his usual
fashion, Patel describes the existing dense urban fabric as a “congested” space that needs
to be cleaned up and opened up. But the project that Patel describes in purely technical
terms of efficiency also supports very different readings. Banaras is the holiest city in
Hinduism and the parliamentary seat from which Modi contests national elections.
Laying the foundation stone of the corridor, Modi explained that it enabled the
“liberation” of Lord Shiva, the deity of the temple, who had been feeling “suffocated”
due to the lack of space around the temple.295
The phrase “soft Hindutva” has been used by many on the left to describe centrist
opposition politicians – especially upper-caste Hindus who officially espouse secularism
– who profess Hinduism to appeal to voters.296 Televised visits to temples, the peppering
of speeches with Sanskrit phrases, the chanting of Hindu prayers by opposition
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politicians are all part of a politics of appeasement that accedes to the Hindu nationalist
framing of India as a Hindu country and contributes further to establishing Hinduism as
the grounds for politics in India. Soft Hindutva is described as a symptom of the gradual
rightward shift of the discourse and symbolism of electoral politics in India. As the most
lucid critics have pointed out, the problem with soft Hindutva is not simply that
Hinduism is being used tactically by certain politicians, but rather that it expresses the
underlying casteist Hindu disposition of the nation-state at large, even among professedly
secular elements.297
The aesthetics of governance under Modi is the neoliberal analogue of soft
Hindutva in the economic realm. Here the forces of Hindutva use the language of
technocratic managerialism – developed in large part by the Congress and Aam Aadmi
Party298 – to screen their more rabid politics such that the state’s projects remain palatable
to the Indian corporate elite and the global forces of capital from which the BJP craves
recognition. Just as governance can be fungible with soft Hindutva, so too can the latent
violence of soft Hindutva be translated into more spectacular and open forms of violence.
For example, more is at stake than meets the eye in the clearing of congestion, the
liberation of Shiva in Banaras. Journalist Sushil Kumar argues that the creation of an
open space around the temple paves the way for the violent destruction of the Gyanvapi
mosque, which shares a boundary wall with the temple. According to the Kumar the
project, which is being carried out in the name of decongestion and modernization, is
laying the ground for a repeat of the 1991 demolition of the Babri Masjid by a Hindu
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mob under Modi’s mentor and BJP leader LK Advani.299
The Central Vista may not directly be paving the way for bloody acts of violence,
but here too any charges that architecture expresses Hindu ideology is defused by the
claim that the project is “merely infrastructural”.300 In fact, the problem is both
ideological and infrastructural. Like soft Hindutva, the language of technocratic
efficiency is not simply a tactical move. It also expresses the underlying disposition of
Indian politics, one where maximum governance has middle-class mass political appeal.
The innocence of the managerial register affords plausible deniability.301 This
heteroglossia turns the Central Vista into an empty signifier, making it easy for the BJP’s
supporters to see the Central Vista as a symbol of Hindutva but harder for its critics to
attack on this count.

A Bureaucratic Counter-Environment
At the same time as they are transformed into more efficient and productive workers, the
users of the Central Vista are to be increasingly insulated from territory they govern.
Historian Narayani Gupta has evocatively described the informal urban environment and
economy that supported the existing Central Vista buildings

:
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“The Indian Champs Elysees is coming to life-in a way very different from what
Lutyens intended. Foodstalls and eateries are normal ancillary developments
whenever an office complex is built. The architectural snobbery of the
Secretariats is maintained by banishing all these stalls from the facade and
allowing them to proliferate at the rear. The Bhavans are hemmed in by these, as
well as by innumerable vendors enticing the officegoers with temptations,
mounds of handkerchiefs, shiny pens, wallets, aphrodisiacs. In recent years the
items aimed at women have increased, with arrays of atomizers and handbags.
Thus a sizable area of the Vista is a miniature bazaar, with its complement of
dhabas (makeshift eateries).”302
All this informality is to be banished by Patel, who speaks with horror of “ad hoc
vending”.303 If the existing government buildings had a severe front that faced the grand
Central Vista, their backs were hives of informal activity. The new Secretariat buildings
will be surrounded on all sides by a moat of approach roads and high-security perimeter
walls, rendering the bazaar impossible. Organized around large central courtyards, the
new buildings will be characterized by a relation of inside to outside rather than front to
back. Mimicking Lutyens’ architecture, all four faces of each building will take on an
austere sandstone cladding, perforated by small louvred windows. The courtyard-facing
walls, however, will be covered in floor-to-ceiling glass windows, giving a view of the
tree-canopied courtyard. In effect, the external face will retain a conservative
governmental façade, while the internal face will fully perform the architecture of high-
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tech management.
The Indian subcontinent has a long history of courtyard houses, a form that
largely fell out of favour in the colonial era but was revived in the 1980s. Charles Correa,
one of the foremost postcolonial proponents of courtyards, found in the typology a clear
statement of the “great lyricism in the Indian temperament”.304 For the spirituallyinclined Correa, courtyards represented a climate-appropriate, “open-to-sky” architecture
in which “the boundaries … between room and verandah and terrace and courtyard … are
blurred and casual, so that one passes easily from one to another”.305 Though they may at
first glance echo Correa’s postcolonial appropriation of the courtyard, the climatecontrolled Secretariat buildings, sealed off from their environment, more closely
resemble what Correa called the “closed box”. Indeed in an uncanny echo of midcentury
American architect and designer Eliot Noyes, who called courtyards “squared
doughnuts”, Patel refers to his Secretariat plan as consisting of “doughnut-shaped
buildings”.306
[Figures 15-17]
Architecture historian John Harwood characterizes the squared doughnut, replicated
by Noyes in buildings around the world for the IBM corporation, as “courtyard-fortress
architecture”. According to Harwood, the hard externality and inward orientation
provided by courtyards rendered each of the multinational corporation’s buildings as a
“counterenvironment”, “an enclosure organized over and against the surrounding,
disorganized environment.”307 In India, where informal bazaars cluster around office
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buildings, the high-modernist imperative to keep out the chaotic outside is even stronger
than it may be in suburban New York. According to Harwood, the courtyard-fortress
form is “a large-scale realization of the computer”: it is because of the carefully managed
space of the counterenvironment, segmented off from the territory that surrounds it and
connected to each other through underground cables and satellite infrastructure, that “a
global view of interconnected data-processing centers became possible”.308
Just as IBM’s architecture expressed its ambitions of global, interconnected dataprocessing, the design of the Secretariat buildings sublimates the aspirations of digital
India. In order for the state’s access to the nation to be primarily digital, through NITI
Aayog’s indices or the cybertime of Aadhaar, the interface between the state and its
territory can no longer remain one of direct, face-to-face interaction where anyone might
walk in and out of the government building into the city. Like information carried
through cables, bureaucrats, remade into innovating knowledge workers, will travel
through underground pipes and enter and exit the buildings from below. Everything takes
place out of sight and instantly. The exterior facades relate to the city as pure ceremonial
surface. In the hermetically networked Central Vista Secretariat, dreams of maximum
governance find their architectural form. It is one thing for a corporation selling
computers to dramatize turning away from the surrounding environment and into the
network; it is a different matter altogether for a state that is accountable to its citizens to
do so.
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An Icon of Governance
What then is the relationship between governance, of which the Central Vista is an
icon, and government, which it is built to house? Governance, the promise goes, is to be
maximized, while government is to be minimized. What to make of the paradoxical
situation when both inhabit the same house? An earnest answer might suggest that when
he says “minimum government” Modi is only referring to certain parts of the
government, to the many state-run enterprises that are quickly being divested (as another
of Modi’s slogans puts it “government has no business being in business”), to the
bureaucratic procedures that are being pared down. In fact, one might say in Modi’s
defence, despite the gigantism of these new buildings, they are minimizing the oldfashioned, bureaucratic, corrupt old government that we’ve known and hated. Or, more
critically, one might say that the size of the new buildings is the symbol of the sovereign
– and violent – power of an executive that is increasingly unaccountable to the public.309
But a more cynical answer would be that in spite of its newfound architectural
form, or perhaps because of it, the pair of “maximum governance, minimum governance”
is more slippery than ever. It is at the same time extraordinarily difficult for its critics to
find purchase on and a potent site for the projection of various aspirational nationalist
fantasies. Maximum governance will not cause government to disappear, as Aadhaar’s
architect Nandan Nilekani promised it would, or to become “minimum”, as Modi
promises. Rather, governance and government are empty signifiers, exist in a shifting
relationship, sometimes in opposition to each other, sometimes reinforcing the other’s
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worst qualities.
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Dissent and Democracy in Postcolonial India
The history of postcolonial India can be thought of as a succession of forms of
visualization, enumeration, construction and identification. Citizens have been regularly
counted and periodically issued a range of identity documents, including ration cards,
voter IDs and permanent account numbers. New architectures have animated political
capitals around the country, from modernist tabula rasa projects in Chandigarh,
Bhubaneswar and Gandhinagar in the 1950s and 1960s to the fantastical neo-Buddhist
interventions that remade Lucknow in the 2000s. Sophisticated and unsophisticated
techniques have been used to measure economic and social progress since at least the
1950s.310 Seen historically, the projects that are being carried out in the name of
governance are the latest developments in a lineage of techno-social projects that have
been central to postcolonial statecraft.
Yet something new is also at work here. Replacing “good governance” with
“maximum governance” has turned bland managerial projects into programmes of public
relations, ways of attracting investment as well as components of the BJP’s “state of
quasi-permanent mobilization and spectacle”.311 Governance in contemporary India no
longer refers only to the technical content of interventions but also their form.312 The
innovation under Modi’s BJP is not in the invocation of ideals of good governance,
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transparency or efficiency so much as the way they have been performed as part of an
aesthetic project of managerial populism.
Today many liberals are nostalgic for the Congress’ technocratic orientation
towards managerial values in the mid-2000s. That was a form of government for which,
despite its excesses and injustices, there existed a coherent and powerful critique and
opposition, and which largely remained within the checks and balances of postcolonial
democracy (if only due to sustained pressure from people). In other words, it was a form
of power that was, by and large, predictable within the coordinates of postcolonial liberal
democracy. It is increasingly questionable whether it is possible to return to that form of
government. Even in the unlikely chance that an opposition party were to win the
national elections, it would have little reason to undo a project like Aadhaar, which grants
the state vast powers over its citizens. And even if a return to that form of government
was desirable – and it is not at all clear that it is, only that it is preferable to the current
situation – the most important question is one of method: how to challenge, subvert, or
destroy the changes that the managerial populism has introduced to Indian state and
society?
Until 2014, shying away from radical social upheavals, civil society activists
engaged with the institutions of the state to effectively impose limits on its power. Since
the 1980s, the courts – and the Supreme Court in particular – have been a major site for
civil society interventions at the national scale, from major environmental movements to
movements for the rights of squatters. But the aestheticisation of governance under Modi
has led to an interesting paradox: techno-managerial performances of governance often
undercut the rule of law, which is globally considered a major component of the good
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governance agenda. For example, in blatant violation of democratic procedure, the laws
and regulations that govern Aadhaar were passed using a legislative form called the
“money bill”, which enabled it to bypass parliamentary scrutiny. In other words, rather
than acting as a check on the state (which is one of good governance’s main aims as
expressed by the World Bank), governance in the time of managerial populism has
become an open expression of the sovereign power of the executive. Meanwhile, the
courts have increasingly been an ineffective site for redress: legal challenges against both
Aadhaar and the Central Vista project have failed dramatically. As anti-caste scholar
Anand Teltumbde writes, “Given the pace with which the forces of darkness are scaling
the ramparts, to persist in believing that technicalities such as constitutional barriers will
prove any hurdle to them would betray monumental naivete.”313
Alongside the spaces of civil society, Indian politics has been characterised by a
modality of action that postcolonial theorist Partha Chatterjee calls “political society”.314
Unlike civil society, which is characterised by reasonable debate and discussion within
the norms of liberal democracy, political society is a domain of subaltern mass protest
and electoral movements aimed at gaining concessions from the state within the state’s
frameworks of enumeration and distribution. As such, groups that use political society
have shaped themselves to fit the identity categories of the postcolonial state. Its greatest
successes have been in various agitations by caste communities to gain reservations, or
affirmative action, in educational and state institutions. Because it is predicated on the
state’s own categories, political society too appears to be unable to respond to the
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initiatives of maximum governance. This is encapsulated by the broad public response to
Aadhaar, which was in almost all cases to immediately enrol in the programme, and for
good reason, as nobody wanted to risk exclusion. As activist lawyer Usha Ramanathan
argues, it is difficult to expect subaltern resistance to technocratic infrastructures when
they are also the key to welfare that can be the difference between life and death.315

Making Failure Stick
In a recent book, Arjun Appadurai and Neta Alexander point out that failure is a
collective judgement rather than an empirical condition.316 Some actors, some ways of
organizing the world, are incredibly adept at avoiding its taint. Civil society assessments
of the BJP’s promises repeatedly reveal failure, even by the government’s own measures:
policies like demonetization – the overnight withdrawal of the 500-rupee note from
circulation – and the introduction of a new Goods and Services Tax have failed to
materialize the promised growth in GDP, instead dampening economic growth. Despite
all the promotion around it, Aadhaar failed to reduce leakages in the welfare delivery
system, even causing starvation deaths among groups who previously received food
subsidies. The destructive second wave of the covid-19 pandemic was utterly
mismanaged and resulted in millions of deaths. Yet the ruling party has been extremely
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adept at shrugging off these failures and retooling them as successes, necessary sacrifices
or feedback to improve the system.
In large part this has been accomplished through an aggressive PR machinery and
the systematic erosion of the free press and the capitulation of large sections of the
corporate media. But it is also an emanation of the BJP’s Hindu managerialism. The
BJP’s projects of maximum governance have borrowed the tech world’s orientation
towards failure – one of “perpetual beta”, where failures are continually made productive,
absorbed as learnings into new designs.317 This is, according to Irani, one of the chief
signs of the entrepreneurial. It also draws from a Hindu notion of sacrifice, where failure
is rendered in moral terms. This ruthless cocktail turns the BJP into a perfect “machine of
broken promises aimed at denying or dismissing the existence of failure”.318 Even so,
managerial populism, thoroughly aestheticized and seemingly immune to failure, is
resulting in new forms of dissent, new distributions of the sensible. What do these look
like, and where are they already taking place?
The continuing work of exposing the BJP’s failure to live up to its promises with
facts and figures is crucial, as is the exposure of its failures to follows the norms and
procedures laid down by the law. But demystification – which is the province of a usually
elite civil society – cannot be restricted to the bloodless language of truth and reason.
Transparency and efficiency are simultaneously epistemic virtues – forms of organizing
technical processes, which are often aesthetic – as well as political virtues – ideals that
politicians and bureaucrats seek to embody.319 A project like Land Conflict Watch, for
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example, composed of a national network of reporters, mobilizes a digitally savvy
interface that aestheticizes numbers to track instances of violence and dispossession in
corporate and government land grabs around the country. A “data research agency”
plugged into global networks of data journalism, the organization plays the game of
managerial governance, contesting the government’s monopoly on world-classness in
order to expose the depredations of the state and large corporations.
The BJP sells a miraculous vision in which techno-managerial systems of
governance can be both transparent and efficient, where both these virtues are left
ambiguous and undefined. In the past – and in other countries – transparency and
efficiency have often been seen as conflicting principles. Calls for increased transparency
are often countered with the argument that the procedures for increased oversight will
reduce the state’s efficiency. As such, ongoing efforts that centre different notions of
transparency and efficiency are also potent sites of exposing the BJP’s contradictions. In
electoral politics, opposition parties especially at the regional level have contested the
BJP’s self-promoted image of transparency, for example after Modi instituted a covid
fund, the PM CARES fund, that collected billions of unaccounted for dollars that is
exempt from Right to Information legislation, though again Modi has largely remained
immune to these charges. At the more grassroots level, organizations like the MKSS,
which used India’ right to information legislation to audit government programmes in
public fora, in a form known as “social audits”, for example, pioneered a people-centred
form of transparency that still exists at the local level.
It is precisely when the infrastructures of efficiency, by now well entrenched, are
put to particularly violent, exclusionary or extractive ends – and formalized in law – that
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the most powerful forms of dissent have emerged. The introduction of three new
agricultural laws in 2020 that, among other things, would institutionalize contract
farming and end state agricultural markets led to a massive farmers’ movement across
North India. And the BJP’s moves to disenfranchise Indian Muslims through the
Nationwide Register of Citizens and the Citizenship Amendment Act in 2019 led to large
protests and occupations of public space across the country. In these cases, dissent has
turned to an aesthetic and ethical project that has been somewhat successful at making
BJP’s failures stick. In a rare move, the BJP was forced to backtrack on its agricultural
laws, though notably without admitting failure.
The emergence of a popular form of constitutionalism may be hopeful, for it
wrenches law, and its claims to justice, out of the courts and into the public.320 During the
wave of protests against the CAA that took place in 2019 and 2020, the constitution
emerged as an important symbolic and ethical anchor. Straddling civil and political
society, public invocations of the constitution to challenge Hindu nationalism dramatized
law in a way that may yet be more effective than the courts. This is a novel emergence in
contemporary India, a symptom of what theorist Ajay Gudavarthy calls “post-civil
society”.321 Its effects were not only restricted to the protests but are visible in other
domains as well. The Right to Information request, a means of accessing government
information, for example, has become a mediatized genre on social media, where such
requests are routinely shared, often with state refusals to divulge information. The effects
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of this popular constitutionalism, which Kalpana Kannabiran has called the “constitutionas-commons” are still emerging.322
The protests have also shown that contesting the BJP’s monopoly on nationalism
has been effective and necessary. National symbols were strategically and – disarmingly
for liberals and leftists – enthusiastically taken up by protestors. As journalist Shivam Vij
has argued, “nationalism is the masala that can make any food tasty… The only way to
reclaim secularism is to first reclaim nationalism. If secularists are uncomfortable with
nationalism, they should be ready for the declaration of India as a de facto Hindu nationstate very soon.”323 If anything is clear, it is that there is little room left for the certainties
and pieties of the well-worn models of dissent in India, particularly those of civil society.
Many tactics and vocabularies are necessary to expose the violence, absurdity and
injustice of the BJP’s managerial infrastructures for what they are: failures of Indian state
and society.

The Violence of Maximum Governance
This thesis has tried to describe a part of the story of the new India that is often treated as
a self-evident matter of fact. Hindutva – albeit in a new, hypermediated form – is
implicitly treated as key to Modi’s electoral appeal while the managerial face of his
appeal is assumed to face more towards middle-class and corporate India. But
governance is slippery, it takes on different meanings for different actors, a remarkable

322
323

Kannabiran, “Constitution-As-Commons.”
Vij, “How Indian Secularism Could Still Be Saved.”

Samdub 133
shared vocabulary that provides both a common playing field and plausible deniability
for its users. If Modi’s appeals to “minimum government, maximum governance” are less
studied, it is for a very good reason: lives are not directly at stake here in the way they are
with Hindutva. But the fuzzy, ambiguous, latent violence within these infrastructures is
fungible with more bloody forms of violence.324
In some cases, these infrastructures have required events of hardship that are
disproportionately felt by the poor, as in the demonetization that was the coercive catalyst
for the uptake of Aadhaar’s digital payments ecosystem. In others, they lay the grounds
for increasingly genocidal violence against Muslims and minorities, as in Bimal Patel’s
Kashi Viswanathan project in Banaras. In Ahmedabad, Patel’s supposedly efficient and
rationalist urban planning has resulted in the displacement and impoverishment of tens of
thousands of families. Sometimes, such infrastructures are actively complicit in
deregulation and privatization that has led to increased precarity around the country.
Surveying Aadhaar’s biggest beneficiaries reveals that it facilitates the selective
enrichment of corporate capital in the name of anti-poverty. In another variation, the
Central Vista masks the government’s genocidal Hindu nationalism by aestheticizing
efficiency and transparency. And increased efficiency can and is being used to better
target Muslims and the poor for exclusion and violence. Everywhere we look, these
infrastructures are leading to dispossession, extraction and accumulation; in many cases,
to genocidal violence. The hope of this thesis has been to illuminate these violences and
the slippery systems that produce them.
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